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BARGAINING INEQUALITY:
EMPLOYEE GOLDEN HANDCUFFS AND ASYMMETRIC
INFORMATION
ABSTRACT
Inaccurate unicorn firm valuation is a well-documented
problem in the finance literature. Employees of these large,
privately held companies do not have access to fair market
valuation or financial statements and, in many cases, are
denied access to such reports, even when requested. Unicorn
employees are granted equity as a substantial part of their
compensation, however due to the inferior position of
employees in comparison to the start-up founders and other
investors, information shedding light on the value of their
equity grants has been withheld, as apparent in recent
practices.
Start-up founders, investors, and their lawyers have
systematically abused equity award information asymmetry to
their benefit. This Article sheds light on the latest practice that
compels employees, who are not yet stockholders, to waive their
stockholder inspection rights under Delaware General
Corporation Law (“DGCL”) Section 220 as a condition to
receiving stock options from the company. Perhaps the clearest
indication of this new practice is the recent amendment to the
National Venture Capital Association legal forms, which is
intended to standardize a contractual “waiver of statutory
inspection rights.” This waiver is designed to contract around
stockholder inspection rights.
This Article puts forward competing arguments and
policy considerations for and against such a waiver. It fills the
gap in the case law and evaluates whether a contract between
the company and its employees, which operates independently
and outside the charter or bylaws, can modify or eliminate the
mandatory inspection rights expressly set forth in the DGCL.
The resolution on this issue will have tremendous influence on
corporate law, litigation, and practice.
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I.

INTRODUCTION
Investors, founders and the law firms they work with
systematically & ruthlessly exploit start-up equity
information asymmetry to their gain and employees’
pain.
- Chris Zaharias1
Have you ever wondered about the value of the options
and shares that startups issue to employees? If you ask
the startup CEO, she tells you they are winning lottery
tickets. If you ask your grandmother, she tells you they
are worthless.
- Will Gornall & Ilya Strebulaev2

Information is power.3 Investment in private markets is risky
and plagued with information asymmetry. Information asymmetry
arises in situations where one party in a transaction has more
information regarding the subject of the transaction than the
other.4 Private companies operate in the dark. Information asymmetry
For comments and suggestions, thanks are due to Jonathan Adler, Brian
Broughman, Margaret Blair, Patrick Corrigan, Assaf Hamdani, Charlie
Korsmo, Geeyoung Min, Jessie Hill, Leo Strine, Stephen Bainbridge, Jesse
Fried, Ann Lipton, Jay Ritter, Nizan Packin, Juliet Kostritzky, Marcel
Kahan, Jens Dammann, Omari Scott Simmons, Will Moon, Verity Winship,
Sergio Gramitto Ricci, Darren Rosenblum, Ed Rock, Jonathan Macey, Joan
Heminway, Juscelino Colares, Cassandra Roberts, Sharona Hoffman, David
Yermack, Yaakov Amihud, Miriam Schwartz, Stephen Choi, Casimiro
Nigro, Jill Fisch, Peter Robau, Gerald Rosenfeld, Karen Brenner, Sara
Samaha, Kathaleen McCormick, Brandon K. Wharton, Yifat Aran, and the
participants at the NYU Law and NYU Stern Pollack Center Corporate
Governance Workshop, the Goethe University Foundations of Law and
Finance Seminar, and the ABA Annual Meeting, Private Equity and Venture
Capital Committee, Perspectives on Cutting Edge Issues. A special thank
you to my amazing research assistants, John Livingstone and Colleen
Campbell. This paper is dedicated to Margaret Blair. All errors are my own.
*Assistant Professor, Case Western Reserve University School of Law.
1
Nicholas Carlson, Startup Employees Are Getting Screwed by VCs and
CEOs, Says 22-Year Industry Insider, BUSINESSINSIDER.COM (Mar. 6,
2014), https://www.businessinsider.com/this-22-year-veteran-of-startupssays-employees-are-getting-screwed-by-vcs-and-ceos-2014-3.
2
Will Gornall & Ilya Strebulaev, VALUATION.VC, http://valuation.vc
(last visited Mar. 5, 2021).
3
Sir Francis Bacon published in his work, Meditationes Sacrae (1597),
the saying: “knowledge itself is power.” FRANCIS BACON, MEDITATIONES
SACRAE (1597).
4
See George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality
Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84(3) Q. J. ECON. 488, 493 (1970)
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creates entrepreneurial opportunities for such firms because they are
not required to disclose information to the public on their financials,
fair market value or strategy. Information asymmetry can also generate
a market failure if not managed properly by the firm.5
This Article questions the basic allocation of power between
boards and stakeholders, which include rank-and-file employees, under
U.S. corporate law.6 Employees of a venture-backed startup can
become shareholders in the firms that they work for because they are
offered equity as part of their compensation. The high-tech industry
predominantly relies on the practice of awarding options to rank-andfile employees.7 These options commonly require a large out-of-pocket
investment on the part of employees to convert to stock.8 After the
employees exercise their options, they become a minority common
shareholder.9
A shareholder can enjoy several rights associated with
ownership, including returns, control over how the business operates
(voting and inspection), risk of loss (distribution), duration (terminate
or transfer) and the right to sue. These rights are not absolute. Boards,
managers and employees will typically bargain over these rights in
private agreements. The parties’ ability to bargain is subject to several
constraints, including state laws, government regulation, information
asymmetry, conflict of interest and the incomplete nature of contracts.10
This Article sheds light on a new practice designed to limit
employees’ rights as investors and keep them in the dark.11 Stock
option agreements now contain a new contractual waiver of
stockholder inspection rights that prevents employees from accessing
(Akerlof discusses the “adverse selection” problem, as well as firms’
offerings of equity that may be associated with the “lemons” problem).
5
Pierre Barbaroux, From Market Failures to Market Opportunities:
Managing Innovation Under Asymmetric Information, 3 J. INNOVATION &
ENTREPRENEURSHIP 5 (2014), https://doi.org/10.1186/2192-5372-3-5.
6
See infra Section II.
7
See J. BLASI, D. KRUSE & A. BERNSTEIN, IN THE COMPANY OF
OWNERS: THE TRUTH ABOUT STOCK OPTIONS AND WHY EVERY EMPLOYEE
SHOULD HAVE THEM 86 (2003). See Anat Alon-Beck, Unicorn Stock
Options—Golden Goose or Trojan Horse, 2019 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 107
(2019).
8
See infra Section III.
9
See infra Section III discussing the ways in which employees can
become stockholders.
10
See William A. Klein, John C. Coffee, Jr. & Frank Partnoy, BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS AND FINANCE, LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 3 (2010).
11
See infra Section V.
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information about the value of their stock. This is the latest
development in an ongoing trend to deprive tech employees from
information about their investment in the firm that they work for. It all
started when the social-networking company - Facebook, now Meta,
was in violation of our securities laws when it passed the 500
shareholders of record threshold at the end of 2011.12 Facebook
successfully lobbied Capitol Hill and Congress to increase the number
of shareholders of record and exclude employees. Prior to the JOBS
Act, employees were protected as investors by our securities laws.
Start-ups were required to count employees as shareholders and
provide them with disclosures on material information. A trend that
started with our securities laws is now creeping into our state corporate
laws.
Lobbyists convinced regulators that company employees are
insiders who don’t need protections of mandatory disclosure. This
Article rejects this view. Employees in large firms need protection.
Employees of a small startup may be privy to information about their
firm. Rank-and-file employees of large private firms are not wellpositioned to monitor their company’s progress.13 Their economic
incentives are not aligned with those of the founders or managers. They
are not protected by the bargaining ability of other sophisticated
investors, such as VC investors. Sophisticated investors are usually
represented and can bargain for the ability to access information.
Inaccurate unicorn firm valuation is extremely severe and welldocumented in the finance literature. Unicorn employees cannot value
their equity grants, because they do not have access to fair market
valuation or financial statements and, in many cases, are denied access
to such reports, even if they ask for them. Start-up founders, investors,
and their lawyers systematically abuse equity award information
asymmetry to their benefit. This Article sheds light on the latest
practice that compels employees, who are not yet stockholders, to
waive their stockholder inspection rights under Delaware General
Corporation Law (“DGCL”) Section 220 as a condition to receiving
12

See Alon-Beck, supra note 6; see also Paul Sloan, Three Reasons
Facebook Has to Go Public, CNET.COM (Jan. 31, 2012),
https://www.cnet.com/tech/services-and-software/three-reasons-facebook-hasto-go-public/; see also Capital Formation, Job Creation and Congress: Private
Versus Public Markets: Hearing on Government-Business Forum on Small
Business Capital Formation Before the Sec. & Exchange Comm’n (2011)
(Testimony of John C. Coffee, Jr., Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law
Columbia University Law School and Director of its Center on Corporate
Governance,
https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/sbforum111711-materialscoffee.pdf.
13

See infra Section III.
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stock options from the company.14 The recent amendment to National
Venture Capital Association legal forms is intended to standardize the
contractual “waiver of statutory inspection rights.”15 The waiver is
designed to contract around stockholder inspection rights.
Delaware law is clear that stockholders’ inspection right is not
without limits. It is less clear to what extent it may be contractually
limited and, more importantly, whether employees, as future minority
stockholders, can contract away their information rights entirely.16
DGCL Section 220 was designed to protect stockholders that require
information to value their stock holdings, especially in the context of a
private corporation, with no access to a liquid market. I argue that ex
ante efforts to limit employee stockholder inspection rights via private
ordering do not fit with the goals of corporate law.
There is a rise in the number of inspection requests under
Section 220.17 Employees can request to value their stock. If companies
want to avoid this type of demand, they need to provide information to
their employees, as they used to not too long ago.18 Under common
law, shareholders were given access to information to protect their
property interest in their investment in the firm. Most states in the
United States, including Delaware, have codified common law
inspection rights, with variations from state to state.
Inspection rights are one of the few “immutable” mandatory
rules of corporate law.19 In Delaware, stockholder inspection rights
14

See Roy Shapira, Corporate Law, Retooled: How Books and Records
Revamped Judicial Oversight, 42 CARDOZO L. REV. 1949 (2021). See
George S. Geis, Information Litigation in Corporate Law, 71 ALA. L. REV.
407, 410, 414 (2019) (“[i]nvoking the right magic words—such as ‘I want
to value my stock’—should not automatically open the doors to sensitive
prospective corporate data”).
15
See infra Section III.
16
See infra Section IV.
17
Edward B. Micheletti & Bonnie W. David, Recent Trends in Books and
Records Litigation, SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP (Jan. 21,
2020), https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2020/01/recent-trendsin-books-and-records-litigation.

I will not review efforts to limit rights ex post in nondislosure
agreements.
19
See Jill Fisch, Stealth Governance: Shareholder Agreements and
Private Ordering, 99 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022); Gabriel
Rauterberg & Eric Talley, Contracting Out of the Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty:
An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Opportunity Waivers, 117 COLUM. L.
REV. 1075 (2017); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Optimal
Defaults for Corporate Law Evolution, 96 NW. U.L. REV. 489, 496 n.16
(2002) (providing “the duty of loyalty of corporate directors” as an example
of mandatory corporate governance regulation); Jill E. Fisch, Picking a
18
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cannot be eliminated or limited by a provision in a corporation’s
certificate of incorporation or bylaws.20 However, there is ambiguity in
the case law in regard to the ability to eliminate this right via contract.
Unicorn employees are now regularly coerced to waive this inspection
right by entering into a contract with the corporation, in the form of a
stock option agreement. Their employers, who are unicorn fiduciaries,
receive the benefit of operating without oversight from minority
common stockholders – their employees.
The Delaware Court of Chancery has yet to answer the question
of whether an employee, can waive her rights to inspect books and
records under Section 220 by signing an option agreement that contains
such a waiver. This practice is new and, in many cases, the employees
are putting forth the argument that they signed the waiver without any
knowledge. There are even fraud allegations whereby employees had
no idea that they were signing on new language that is not “normal” or
“customary” for the stock option-type deals that tech companies in
Silicon Valley have used for decades. Many employees further
complain that they were intentionally misled into signing or not
provided copies of the agreements prior to signing.
This Article tracks this new development and presents the
following questions: Can statutory stockholder inspection rights be
waived? Should Delaware Courts enforce these contractual limits on
stockholder rights? Should Delaware Courts extend this protection to
certain stakeholders? This issue surrounding stock option awards is
Winner, 20 J. CORP. L. 451, 458 (1995); Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law
Trivial? A Political and Economic Analysis, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 542, 551-53
(1990) (citing self-dealing rules as one example of mandatory law); Melvin
Aron Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
1461, 1486 (1989) (arguing that self-dealing rules are “largely mandatory,
at least for publicly held corporations”); Randall S. Thomas, What Is
Corporate Law's Place in Promoting Societal Welfare?: An Essay in Honor
of Professor William Klein, 2 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 135, 139 (2005) (stating
self-dealing rules are mandatory for public corporations); Marcel Kahan,
The Qualified Case Against Mandatory Terms in Bonds, 89 NW. U. L. REV.
565, 607 n.164 (1995) (claiming that the rules on self-dealing by managers
are mandatory). DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(17).
20
Cochran v. Penn-Beaver Oil Co., 34 Del. 81, 88 (1926) (holding that
a charter provision that “permits the directors to deny any examination of
the company's records by a stockholder is unauthorized and ineffective”);
Rainbow Navigation, Inc. v. Pan Ocean Navigation, Inc., 535 A.2d 1357,
1359 (Del. 1987) (the shareholders’ right of inspection “can only be taken
away by statutory enactment”); BBC Acquisition Corp. v. Durr-Fillauer
Med., Inc., 623 A.2d 85, 90 (1992) (a shareholder’s inspection rights “cannot
be abridged or abrogated by an act of the corporation”). See Geeyoung Min,
Shareholder Voice in Corporate Charter Amendments, 43 J. CORP. L. 289,
294 (2018).
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garnering intense debate and attention in Silicon Valley, especially
because of the rise in disputes between venture capital-backed unicorns
and their employees.21
To illustrate this predicament, this Article will introduce the
Domo and JUUL cases. This new waiver practice became popular
following the Domo case and its extensive media coverage. Relying on
a hand-collected data set consisting of the SEC’s public filings, which
included tech companies that had filed an Initial Public Offering
(“IPO”) prior to and following Domo, I found that many firms began
requiring that their employees sign a waiver clause titled “Waiver of
Statutory Information Rights ”22 following Domo. I also discovered
that the National Venture Capital Association (the “NVCA”) recently
updated its set of model legal documents to incorporate this waiver
clause.23 Accordingly, many law firms have since updated their clients’
stock option restriction agreement templates to include this waiver
provision.24
It is not clear whether a stockholder waiver of statutory rights
would be enforceable by a court, such as Delaware. This Article puts
forward the competing arguments and policy considerations for and
against enforcing a stockholder inspection rights waiver.25 It fills the
gap in the case law and evaluates whether a contract between the
company and its employees, which operates independently and outside
the charter or bylaws, can modify or eliminate the mandatory
inspection rights expressly set forth in the DGCL. The Delaware
Chancery court will have to answer this question soon. The resolution
on this issue will have tremendous influence on corporate law,
litigation, and practice.

21
David Priebe, Document Inspection Rights for Shareholders of
PIPER,
Private
Companies,
DLA
https://www.dlapiperaccelerate.com/knowledge/2017/documentinspection-rights-for-shareholders-of-private-companies.html (last visited
Mar. 5, 2021).
22
The employees waive their inspection rights of the following
materials: company stock ledger, a list of its stockholders, other books and
records.
23
See infra Section III.
24
See infra Section II.
25
See analogy to Ingle v. Glamor, 535 N.E.2d 1311 (1989). It allows

employee agreements to trump fiduciary duties vis-a-vis employee-shareholders
(NY). See Stephen Bainbridge, CORPORATE LAW (CONCEPTS AND INSIGHTS
TREATISE SERIES) (4th ed. 2020); see also Alyse J. Ferraro, Ingle v. Glamore

Motor Sales, Inc.: The Battle Between Ownership and Employment in the
Close Corporation, 8 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 193 (1990).
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This Article proceeds as follows. Section II examines the
asymmetry of information between the two major groups of investors
in unicorns, the practical effects of it, and the attempts by employees to
address it. Section III explains the design of a stock option agreement—
its original design and new changes. It considers how the problem of
inaccurate unicorn firm valuation affects unicorn employee bargaining
power.
Section IV introduces the role of stockholder inspection rights
in corporate law. It sheds light on a new practice requiring unicorn
employees to sign a waiver clause titled “Waiver of Statutory
Information Rights.” Section V presents some empirical findings,
which reveal that approximately 87% of the unicorn firms in the United
States choose to incorporate in Delaware. Section VI calls for the
Delaware courts and legislature to provide protection for minority
stockholders from oppression and mismanagement by the majority. It
also explores amending the DGCL to expand statutory inspection rights
under Section 220 to include stock option holders. Section VII
concludes by suggesting reforms that could improve governance in
unicorn firms.

II.

THE ASYMETRIC WORLD

Equity compensation makes up more than a quarter
(27%) of employees’ net worth, on average – and more
for Millennials than any other group (41%, versus 21%
for Gen X and 20% for Boomers)[.]
-

Schwab Study26

Any investor that allocates financial or human capital in private
markets deals with information asymmetry. The recent changes to our
rules were enacted on the theory that company employees are likely to
have intimate knowledge of the business and therefore don’t need the
26

Schwab Study: Equity Plan Participants Average Nearly $100,000 in
Vested Stock; Less Than Half Have Ever Sold or Exercised Their Shares,
(Nov.
13,
2019),
BUSINESSWIRE
https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20191113005151/en/SchwabStudy-Equity-Plan-Participants-Average-Nearly-100000-in-Vested-StockLess-Than-Half-Have-Ever-Sold-or-Exercised-Their-Shares
[hereinafter
Schwab Study].
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protections of mandatory disclosure. But that’s not likely to be true of
the enormous private companies that exist today.
A.

All Shareholders are Not Made Equal

This Article focuses on the information asymmetry between the
various groups of investors in unicorn firms: top management
(including founders), outside capital and inside capital that is human
capital (rank-and-file employees). Employees fulfill unique roles
within tech firms as assets and investors at the same time.
This was achieved through contractual innovation. The
employee stock option agreement is an example of an extremely
popular and prevalent practice among growth companies.27 Most hightech start-ups, including Google, Intel, and Microsoft, used this type of
contract to provide equity compensation to their employees, which in
return helped build their companies.28 The stock option agreement
allows employees to cross over from stakeholder status to shareholder.
Tech employees are not only working for the firm but also invest a large
part of their equity in it, as stockholders and stock-option-holders.29
In the United States, tech founders have a long history of
splitting the pie with two types of investors: employees and outside
investors.30 The main differences between these two types of investors
are diversification and negotiating power. Outside investors are usually
diversified. They provide capital to the firm in return for equity, but
also put their eggs in other baskets by investing in other firms.
Employees on the other hand, put all of their eggs in one basket – the
firm’s basket. They are not only employed by the firm but are invested
in it. Investors get diversification of risk while employees do not. To
sum up, investors put money into the business and get shares of stock
to earn a profit. Employees also invest in the company and exchange
their creativity and hard work for the sweat equity needed to create the
game-changing innovations necessary for American competitiveness in
the global marketplace. 31
27

See infra Section III.
Joseph Blasi, Douglas Kruse & Richard Freeman, Having a Stake:
Evidence and Implications for Broad-Based Employee Stock Ownership and
Profit Sharing, THIRD WAY (Feb. 1, 2017).
28

29

There are other types of equity compensation, but this Article will focus
on stock options.
30

See BLASI, KRUSE & A BERNSTEIN, supra note 6. .
See Saul Levmore, Puzzling Stock Options and Compensation Norms,
149 U. PA. L. REV. 1901, 1901 (2001). See also Thomas A. Smith, The
31
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There are times where employees as investors in the firm may
need to make an investment decision, but may not be able to make an
informed one.32 Exercising options is an investment decision, because
it requires employees to pay the option exercise price and, in most
cases, to pay high income tax on paper profits that may never
materialize.33 This Article is about privately-held firms, which means
that investors, including employees, can’t simply sell their shares on an
exchange and generally have restrictions on transfer or sale. There are
new secondary markets, but they are not always available, reliable or
efficient.34
Unicorn employees maybe rich on paper but need money to
exercise their options. They may have to borrow money from outside
sources to keep their shares. They don’t have the ability to finance their
investments by using their options as collateral. If they cannot get
financing or decide not to take the risk, they will have to forfeit the
right to that equity that may become quite valuable down the road if the
company goes public. Many employees simply cannot afford to take
this risk. According to a 2019 Charles Schwab survey, more than half
of startup employees never exercise or sell the pre-IPO stock options
they have earned.35
There are several scenarios where employees will be confronted
with this investment decision. They may consider the prospect of
leaving their jobs, but their options will expire, or their stock will be
subject to a mandatory resale.36 If they received options and worked for
the firm for over 10 years, according to our tax laws, employees may
need to decide to exercise their options or dispose of their shares. Some
may consider selling their stock (or options) into secondary markets,

Zynga Clawback: Shoring Up the Central Pillar of Innovation, 53 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 577, 580 (2013) (discussing at-will contracts and equity
compensation).
32
See infra Section III.
33

On tax treatment, see Alon-Beck, supra note 6.
On secondary markets, see Alon-Beck, supra note 6.
35
Schwab Study, supra note 21.
36
See Alon-Beck, supra note 6, discussing the example of employees at
Good Technology. Good’s share value plunged after the company was acquired,
but the employee-investors still had paid cumbersome tax bills for profits that
never really materialized. Katie Benner, When a Unicorn Start-Up Stumbles, Its
TIMES
(Dec.
23,
2015),
Employees
Get
Hurt,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/27/technology/when-a-unicorn-start-upstumbles-its-employees-get-hurt.html.
34
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provided that they are able to do so.37 Others may find that their options
are prohibitively expensive or risky to exercise due to high pre-IPO
unicorn valuations, liquidity constraints, or other tax concerns.38
Regardless of the decisions they have to make, in nearly every
case, employees have little to no negotiating power to obtain
information about their investment.39 Without access to information,
they cannot accurately value their holdings and may not understand that
the value of their options is likely to diminish if certain types of
nontraditional investor groups join the firm in later rounds due to
special preferred terms and conditions.40
B.

The Practical Effects of Asymmetry

There is information asymmetry between the various types of
investors in unicorn firms: founders, top management, outside capital
and employees, which can lead to market failure if not directed
properly.41 The bargaining power between founders (mangers) and
employee-investors is persistently unequal in the unicorn firm context.
The structural inequality in the bargaining power between the
unicorn firm, as represented by the founders and managers, and its
workers, is referred to in this Article as “bargaining inequality.” This
37
See Alon-Beck, supra note 6, discussing the rise in secondary private
markets. See also MICHAEL J. MAUBOUSSIN & DAN CALLAHAN, MORGAN
STANLEY, PUBLIC TO PRIVATE EQUITY IN THE UNITED STATES: A LONG-TERM
LOOK, 47 (2020); see also Matt Levine, Money Stuff: Boards Have to Pay
(Sept.
13,
2021),
Attention,
BLOOMBERG
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2021-09-13/money-stuffboards-have-to-pay-attention.

38

See infra Section II.

39

Allison Herren Lee, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exchange Comm’n, Remarks
at
The
SEC
Speaks
in
2021
(Oct.
12,
2021),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/lee-sec-speaks-2021-10-12.
40
For more on non-traditional investor groups, see Anat Alon-Beck,
Alternative Venture Capital: The New Unicorn Investors, 87 TENN. L. REV. 983
(2020).

On information asymmetry as a major source of market failures see
Akerlof, supra note 4; on how individuals anticipate others’ intentions see
Michael Spence, Informational Aspects of Market Structure: An
Introduction, 90(4) Q.J. ECON. 591 (1976); on how individuals are
incapable of evaluating the quality of services and market failure see Joseph
E. Stiglitz, The Contributions of the Economics of Information to Twentieth
Century Economics, 115(4) Q. J. ECON. 1441 (2000); see also Michael
Spence, Signaling in Retrospect and the Informational Structure of
Markets, 92(3) AM. ECON. REV. 434 (2002). , 0
41
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bargaining inequality problem disrupts the process of allocating
resources efficiently and the quality of services available on the
market.42 The conflict between the firm, top management, and
employees results from new market dynamics and changes to
traditional unicorn start-up governance arrangements.43
Unicorn founders changed the traditional model of startup
funding model and the governance structures of VC-backed firms.
Founders push to stay private longer and maintain control over the firm.
They are able to do so where VC investment rounds are structured as
founder “friendly” financing rounds.44 In the past, senior managers and
employees both received common stock. Historically, VC-backed
startups issued two classes of stock: common and preferred.
Unicorn founders have more leverage in their negotiations with
VC investors on economic, liquidity and voting rights. Until recently,
it was unimaginable that a venture capital (VC)-backed start-up firm
could reach an aggressive valuation of more than $1 billion without
going public.45 But today, 925 companies are considered “unicorn”
firms46 simply because they are privately owned and valued at $1
billion or more.47 The unicorn list keeps growing, and unicorns are no

Barbaroux, supra note 5.
See Philippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, An Incomplete Contracts
Approach to Financial Contracting, 59 REV. ECON. STUD. 473, 474 (1992)
(sale of the firm can eliminate managers’ positions and their private
benefits); Brian J. Broughman & Jesse M. Fried, Renegotiation of Cash
Flow Rights in the Sale of VC-Backed Firms, 95 J. FIN. ECON. 384, 387
(2010).
44
“Many venerable VCs view the unicorn phenomenon with scorn,
operating under the assumption that billion- dollar valuations are a
distraction— and potentially a detriment—to the traditional startup funding
model.” PITCHBOOK, UNICORN REPORT, 2017 ANNUAL (2017)
https://pitchbook.com/news/reports/2017-annual-unicorn-report (on file
with the Columbia Business Law Review).
45
See David Cogman & Alan Lau, The ‘Tech Bubble’ Puzzle,
MCKINSEY Q., no. 3, at 103, 104 (2016).
46
A “unicorn” firm has the following features for the purposes of this
article: young but large, privately owned but “quasi-public,” invests in
research and development (R&D) with intangible assets, venture capital
(VC)-backed with concentrated ownership and controlling shareholders and
valued at over $1 billion. The term “unicorn” was coined in 2013 by Aileen
Lee. See Jennifer S. Fan, Regulating Unicorns: Disclosure and the New
Private Economy, 57 B.C. L. REV. 583, 586 (2016); Abraham J.B. Cable,
Fool’s Gold? Equity Compensation & the Mature Startup, 11 VA. L. & BUS.
REV. 613, 615 (2017).
47
See The Global Unicorn Club, CB INSIGHTS (June 24, 2021),
https://www.cbinsights.com/research-unicorn-companies.
42
43
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longer rare.48 The pandemic has not at all dampened investor interest
in these firms.49 At the same time, unicorn firms continue to attract
skepticism about their valuations.50
Founder-friendly terms are found in the formation and
financing documents.51 The new structures are designed to give
founders control over the company (in their capacity as shareholders),
48
See Scott Austin, Chris Canip & Sarah Slobin, The Billion Dollar
Startup Club, WALL ST. J. (last updated December 2018),
https://www.wsj.com/graphics/billion-dollar-club/ (on file with the
Columbia Business Law Review) (showing list and valuation of firms as of
December 2018); The Global Unicorn Club, CB INSIGHTS,
https://www.cbinsights.com/research-unicorn-companies
[https://perma.cc/4S6H-TZKB]; The Unicorn List, FORTUNE (last updated
January 19, 2016), http://fortune.com/unicorns/ [https://perma.cc/F7HCMX64]; Unicorns, CNN TECH (last updated June 29, 2018),
https://money.cnn.com/interactive/technology/billion-dollar-startups/
[https://perma.cc/MR2M-7598]. See also Ben Zimmer, How ‘Unicorns’
Became Silicon Valley Companies, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 20, 2015),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/how-unicorns-became-silicon-valleycompanies-1426861606 [https://perma.cc/S3PF-JDL5]. Companies that are
valued at over $10 billion are called “decacorns.”. See Sarah Frier & Eric
Newcomer, The Fuzzy, Insane Math That’s Creating So Many BillionDollar Tech Companies, BLOOMBERG: TECH (Mar. 17, 2015, 9:00 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-17/the-fuzzy-insanemath-that-s-creating-so-many-billion-dollar-tech-companies (on file with
the Columbia Business Law Review) (coining the term decacorns); see also
Jillian D’onfro, There Are So Many $10 Billion Startups that There's a New
Name for Them: ‘Decacorns’, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 19, 2015, 9:42 AM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/decacorn-is-the-new-unicorn-2015-3
[https://perma.cc/8VFS-GDGT].
49
Eric J. Savitz, Unicorns Are Proliferating as the Economy Improves,
BARRON’S (June 3, 2021), https://www.barrons.com/articles/unicorns-cbinsights-total-billion-private-51622746686.
50
See Ilya Strabulaev, ‘Unicorn’ Price Tags Aren't All They're Cracked
Up
To
Be,
TECH
CRUNCH
(Apr.
10,
2018),
https://techcrunch.com/2018/04/10/unicorn-price-tags-arent-all-theyrecracked-up-to-be/.
51
For more on these new terms, see Anat Alon-Beck, Dual Fiduciaries
(forthcoming 2022). See also Caine Moss & Emma Mann-Meginniss, 5
Founder-Friendly Financing Terms that Give Power to Entrepreneurs,
VENTURE BEAT (Nov. 16, 2014), https://venturebeat.com/2014/11/16/5founder-friendly-financing-terms-that-give-power-to-entrepreneurs/;
see
also Jonathan Axelrad, Founder Friendly Stock Alternatives I: Keeping
Control
And
Super-Voting
Common
Stock,
DLA
PIPER,
https://www.dlapiperaccelerate.com/knowledge/2017/founder-friendlystock-alternatives-keeping-control-and-super-voting-common-stock-.html
(last visited Aug. 23, 2018); see Cytowski & Partners, The Anatomy of
a Unicorn, MEDIUM (Aug. 15, 2018) (compares certificates of incorporation
of five leading unicorns: Facebook prior to its IPO, Palantir, Snapchat,
Uber,
and AirBnB),
https://medium.com/@cytlaw/the-anatomy-of-aunicorn-3298df383e03.
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even if their ownership stake is diluted in the future, with additional
rounds of financing. The new structures can have adverse effects on the
board of director’s fiduciary duty and can also subject the employees
as investors to a hold up and abuse by the founders, but this discussion
is outside the scope of this paper.52
C.
Employees Attempt to Seek Recourse in Shareholder
Power
There are several economic theories purporting to explain what
a firm is. In general, these theories have considered the relationship
between employer-employee to be significant to the definition and
purpose of the firm.53 Despite this recognition, unfortunately, corporate
governance scholarship neglected to pay attention to the role of
employees as ”human capital”. It mainly focused on the relationship
between directors, managers, and outside shareholders.54 The time is
ripe for corporate law to take employees, as stakeholders and
shareholders, into account, when defining the legal boundaries of the
firm.
The recent developments with regards to keeping tech
employees in the dark are not surprising since our traditional corporate
law holds the view that the legal relationships between labor, capital,
and the firm are very different. While both labor (human capital) and
capital (financial) contribute to and invest in the firm, only shareholders
that belong to the financial capital group (or their agents) get to decide
how the firm is to be governed.
But this is changing. There is a paradigm shift on the role of
human capital, culture and purpose in corporate governance. This shift
is driven by various influential stakeholders, including activist
investors, tech employees, the Global Reporting Initiative, the
Embankment Project for Inclusive CAPITALISM, the Business

52

See Anat Alon-Beck, Unicorns, Corporate Law and the New Frontiers
(forthcoming 2022).
53
Matthew T. Bodie, Employees and the Boundaries of the Corporation, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW (Claire A. Hill
& Brett H. McDonnell eds., 2012); see Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm,
4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937); see also Kent Greenfield, The Place of Workers in
Corporate Law, 39 B.C. L. REV. 283 (1998).
54
See Anat Alon-Beck, Times They Are a-Changin’: When Tech Employees
Revolt!, 80 MD. L. REV. 120 (2021).
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Roundtable, the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (“SASB”),
and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”).55
Delaware courts also changed their approach in the startup firm
context. They adopted a rule of “common maximization,” which means
that the board of directors have to take the common stockholder
interests into account and seek value for the common in the event of a
sale.56 In 2013, the Delaware Chancery Court issued an opinion In re
Trados Inc.57 The case involved a “fire sale”, which is a sale of
company’s securities at a price that is well below market value,
generally because the company issuing them is in deep water
financially. Historically, board of directors of tech companies were
controlled by venture capital investors. It was very common that fire
sales resulted in payouts only to the preferred shareholders (due to
liquidation preferences), i.e., the venture capital funds. The directors
who are common shareholders and hold senior management positions
get bonuses. But, the other common shareholders, such as employees,
usually don’t get anything from the sale. The Trados court, recognized
that the board of directors was conflicted when making the decision to
sell, and held that the board owes “its primary duty to common
shareholders when the interests of preferred shareholders and common
shareholders come into conflict.”58
55

For more on the paradigm shift, see Alon-Beck, supra note 50; see also
Stephen Klemash, Jennifer Lee & Jamie Smith, Human Capital: Key Findings
from a Survey of Public Company Directors, Harv. L. Sch. F. On Corp.
Governance
(May
24,
2020),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/05/24/human-capital-key-findings-froma-survey-of-public- company-directors/.
56
For more on this rule, see Abraham Cable, Does Trados Matter?, 45 J.

CORP. L. 311 (2020).
57
See In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 78 (2013). Several
legal scholars analyzed the Trados decision. See Cable, supra note 52; see
Robert P. Bartlett III, Shareholder Wealth Maximization as Means to an
End, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 255, 290–95 (2015) (criticizing the court’s
reasoning for failing to recognize the board as a venue for bargaining over
the company’s future); William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, A Theory
of Preferred Stock, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1815, 1874–900 (2013) (discussing
Trados in articulating an over-arching “theory of preferred stock”); Charles
R. Korsmo, Venture Capital and Preferred Stock, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 1163,
1165, 1185–89 (2013) (discussing Trados as a basis for “reassess[ing] the
law’s treatment of preferred stock in the venture capital context”); Elizabeth
Pollman, Startup Governance, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 155 (2019); Simone M.
Sepe, Intruders in the Boardroom: The Case of Constituency Directors, 91
WASH. U. L. REV. 309, 320 & n.12 (2013) (discussing Trados in an
economic analysis of constituency directors); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Poor,
Pitiful, or Potently Powerful Preferred, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 2025, 2039
(2013) (discussing Trados in a response to Bratton and Wachter).
58

See Abraham Cable, Does Trados Matter?, 45 J. CORP. L. 311 (2020).
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The Trados decision is very important because the court
specifically recognized the fact that the Trados board failed to consider
the effects of the transaction in question on common stockholders. Not
only did the board fail to do so, but it made an informed decision that
purposefully ignored the conflict of interest between the different
parties involved.59 Unfortunately, despite the fact that Trados appeared
on numerous blogs and caught the attention of many lawyers, according
to research by Abraham Cable, Trados has not had a substaintial effect
on venture capital financing terms.60
In light of the other developments described above and the
power struggles between the different stakeholders in large startup
firms, this is not surprising that the corporate practice has not changed
significantly. However, it is my view that Trados is important in
perhaps signeling how the Delaware court may treat cases that involve
common shareholders in the furure. One of the largest groups of
common shareholders in a startup are the employees.
Tech employees are different than employees in other
industries. Tech employees are not merely stakeholders but are usually
also equity holders (shareholders) in their firm, as I explain in my
paper, Unicorn Stock Options. Moreover, and more importantly, as
noted by Gorga and Halberstam,61 and later, by Yifat Aran,62 tech firms
use equity compensation to avoid the high costs associated with
employee turnover. Such arrangement not only helps prevent employee
turnover, but also make it possible for employees to participate in the
growth of the business and sharing in the risk.
As discussed in further detail below, only stockholders, not
stock-option-holders can make a demand on the company (board of
directors) to inspect books and records to find out what is the value of
their stock.63 Employees who wanted access to information became
59

See id; See in re Trados, 73 A.3d at 62.

According to Cable, Trados “lawyers now advise boards to more
systematically consider continuation value and, in some cases, push
consideration to common shareholders in excess of their baseline
entitlements.” See id.
61
See Érica Gorga & Michael Halberstam, Knowledge Inputs, Legal
Institutions and Firm Structure: Towards a Knowledge-Based Theory of the
Firm, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1123, 1185, 1192 (2007).
62
Yifat Aran, Note, Beyond Covenants Not to Compete: Equilibrium in
High-Tech Startup Labor Markets, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1235 (2018); Yifat
Aran, Making Disclosure Work for Start-Up Employees, 2019(3) COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 867 (2019).
63
See infra Section IV.
60
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shareholders of record and in their capacity as shareholders started
making demands on the companies that they work for. To deal with the
rise in demands and the desire to not disclose material information
about the firm, some start-ups adopted new contractual mechanisms to
get around this. They require employees to waive their stockholder
inspection rights under DGCL Section 220 as a condition to receiving
stock options from the company.64 This is despite the fact that
inspection rights are especially important in the context of a private
corporation, where stockholders do not have access to a liquid market.65
This latest contractual innovation, however, which compels
employee-stockholders to waive their inspection rights as a condition
to receiving stock options from their company, is very significant.66
Many tech firms, including unicorns, are taking advantage of this new
disclosure arbitrage that was created by changes to our securities laws,
by adopting a new practice that contracts around stockholder inspection
rights and compels employees to waive their rights as stockholders
under Delaware General Corporation Law (“DGCL”) Section 220.67
This is accomplished through private ordering, whereby the
firm requires the employees to waive the right ex ante, by entering into
a separate contract with the employee. Enter the stock option
agreement.68 The employee signs the stock option agreement, which
contains a waiver clause titled “Waiver of Statutory Information
Rights.”69 By signing this waiver, the employee relinquishes her
stockholder rights to inspect the firm’s books and records under Section
64
There is analogy to be drawn between this issue and section 115 of
DGCL. In Bonanno v. VTB Holdings Inc., the Chancery Court drew an important
distinction between forum selection clauses contained in a corporation’s articles
or bylaws, and those contained in external contracts such as a shareholders’
agreement. 2016 WL 614412 (Del. Ch. Feb. 8, 2016). Obviously, the two issues
are not identical, but based on Bonanno – does Delaware have “an overarching
public policy” that prevents stockholders of Delaware corporations from
waiving their stockholder inspection rights? For comparison, see Havlicek v.
Coast-to-Coast Analytical Servs, Inc., 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 696, 699 (Cal. App. 2d
Dist. 1995) (“California has a public policy favoring broad inspection rights for
the directors.”).

See infra Section IV.
See Shapira, supra note 11. See Geis, supra note 11, at 414.
67
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (2006); compare to MODEL
BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 16.02-16.03 (requires corporations to provide
shareholders with annual financial statements).
68
See infra Section V.G on private ordering.
69
The employees waive their inspection rights of the following
materials: company stock ledger, a list of its stockholders, other books and
records, and the books and records of subsidiaries of the company. The
waiver is in effect until the first sale of common stock of the company to the
public.
65

66
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220 of the DGCL thus losing their last avenue of access for
information.70
Stockholder inspection rights are one of the most powerful
fundamental rights in corporate law because they allow stockholders to
inspect nonpublic company information. Inspection rights address the
problem of information asymmetry, which is inherent in all companies,
especially privately held start-up firms.71 These rights were designed to
allow a stockholder to gain access to nonpublic information so the
stockholder can protect her economic interests, make informed
decisions, and hold the company fiduciaries accountable by subjecting
them to oversight, particularly in scenarios like Trados.72
Section 220 of the DGCL not only provides an important
protection to a stockholder by allowing her to seek inspection of the
books and records of a Delaware corporation to investigate potential
wrongdoings but also is used as an important tool in litigation for prefiling investigations. In recent years, we’ve seen a sharp increase in the
general use of Section 220 by the plaintiff’s bar.73 This rise is partly
attributed to Delaware courts’ decisions such as Corwin,74 which raised
the pleading standard for stockholder plaintiffs in stockholder
derivative or post-merger damages suits.
Inspection rights under Section 220 can be an important tool for
hundreds or thousands of tech workers around the country who
received equity awards from unicorns (or other tech firms) in return for
their sweat labor and are now questioning the worth of their shares.75
Unicorn firms raise money at a billion dollar valuation but are not
required to be audited by an independent auditor before issuing equity
compensation to unaccredited or unsophisticated purchasers, namely,
their employees. 76 The problem of inaccurate unicorn firm valuation is

70

See Shapira, supra note 11; Geis, supra note 11.
See infra Section V.
72
See infra Section IV on stockholder inspection rights.
73
See William Gornall & Ilya Strebulaev, Squaring Venture Capital
Valuations with Reality 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 23895, 2017). See also Robert P. Bartlett, III, A Founder’s Guide to
Unicorn Creation: How Liquidation Preferences in M&A Transactions
Affect Start-up Valuation, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON MERGERS &
ACQUISITIONS 123 (Claire A. Hill & Steven D. Solomon eds., 2016).
74
Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings, LLC, 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015).
75
See infra Section IV.D on unicorn valuation.
76
See infra Section IV.
71
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quite severe and greatly limit the ability of employees to understand the
true value of their equity compensation.77
With the rise in the number of unicorn firms in the United
States, there is a need for greater certainty in the exercise of this
inspection right. The employees do not have access to financial reports
and, in many cases, are denied access to such reports even if they ask
for them. Some start-up founders, investors, and their lawyers recently
systematically abused equity award information asymmetry to their
personal benefit. They were able to do so thanks to a change in our
securities laws, one that limits the type of information employees
receive as stockholders. Unicorn employees are left with no choice but
to turn to the courts for help to gain access to such information.78 As a
result, the country may witness a wave of litigation concerning books
and records demands by unicorn employees.79
D.

The Black Box of Unicorn Valuation

Unicorns are private start-up firms, which means they generally
focus on fast scale and large growth and are unprofitable in their early
years. The problem of inflated post-money valuations of unicorn firms
is well-documented in the finance literature.80 Unsophisticated
investors or the press might simply apply the latest series’ share price
to all these investors to determine the valuation of the firm, but this
practice is simply not accurate.
According to Gornall and Strabulaev, unicorns often report
values that are on average about 51% to more than 200% above their
fair market value. To help tech employees figure out the black box of
their unicorn employer’s valuation, Gornall and Strabulaev also created
a new online tool, allowing unicorn employees to properly value their
77

See infra Section III.
See infra Section IV.A. The JOBS Act and subsequent legislation
leave employees vulnerable (as investors in their companies) and subject
them to the discretion of majority shareholders.
79
Corporate law is governed by state law, and changes from state to
state in the United States. Generally, Delaware courts are typically more
management friendly, whereas New York and California courts protect
shareholders.
80
Post-money valuation means a company's estimated worth after
outside financing is added to its balance sheet. It is the market value given
to a start-up firm after a round of financing. See Gornall & Strabualev, supra
note 66. Their research indicates that over 90 percent of mutual funds used
inflated post-money valuations.
78
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stock. It should be noted, however, that Gornall and Strabulaev’s tool
only covers firms they were able to gather information on from various
sources. This is a great initiative, but again, it does not fully solve the
problem of lack of information on these companies.
Start-ups, including unicorns, typically sell shares to private
investors to raise money. They often raise capital in multiple rounds.
Each financing round is unique. Unicorns are different from traditional
start-ups because they are able to stay private longer by raising large
amounts of money from nontraditional investors (i.e., alternative
venture capital).81 Therefore, unicorns have a complex capital
structure. They sell shares to venture capitalists, institutional investors,
hedge funds, mutual funds, corporate venture capitalists, sovereign
wealth funds, Softbank, and other investors. Each of these investors
usually negotiates different terms at each round of financing. Unicorns
can have up to eight classes of stock, or perhaps even more.
Investors typically look at the latest round of financing to try to
determine the exact market value (valuation) of the unicorn. They
usually take the latest stock purchase price and apply that number to all
the outstanding shares. For example, let’s consider the unicorn, Square.
At the last round of financing, Square was able to raise $15.46 a share
for its Series E shares. After the financing round, Square was valued at
$6 billion using the following formula:
“$15.46 Series E shares x ALL outstanding
shares and unissued options = $6 billion”82
Several problems exist with valuing a company this way, as
Gornall and Strabulaev correctly illustrate. This sort of valuation does
not factor in the different contractual terms, such as liquidation
preferences the various investors negotiated for, which were associated
with the Series E stock. Additionally, the investors can negotiate for
different economic rights, such as full ratchet or weighted average
protections. Full ratchet and weighted average are examples of antidilution protections that sophisticated investors negotiate for in the
event of liquidation or failure. These protect early investors by
compensating them in the event of a future dilution in their ownership.
Common and preferred stock do not typically receive the same
protections, which means that common stockholders are likely to get
far less for their shares.
81

See Alon-Beck, supra note 35.
See Gornall & Strabulaev, supra note 66 (Post-money valuations treat
all shares equally in this calculation, but they aren’t equal. Depending on the
type and round of funding, the shares issued can potentially have different
rights and protections).
82
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If we were to use Gornall and Strebulaev’s valuation model,
which considers the different rights and protections of the various
investors’ groups, then a unicorn like Square would not be valued at $6
billion but rather at only $2.2 billion. Note that when Square did
eventually go public, its pre-IPO valuation was set at $2.66 billion.83
Thus Gornall and Strabulaev were spot on with their calculations of
Square’s valuation.
E.

Bargaining under Asymetric Information

The issue of valuation and the ability to make informed
investment decisions is critical for unicorn firm employees as minority
shareholders. A central issue for unicorn employees, who are also stock
option holders, is that they are uninformed about their rights, the true
or accurate valuation of company stock, and the overall financial
stability of the company. They might have access to public information
to some valuation details, but that valuation is wildly inflated. To make
an informed investment decision on whether to exercise or forfeit their
options, they need disclosure and access to appropriate information.84
An investment in a unicorn firm is an investment in private
equity markets, which are categorized by greater information
asymmetries85 when compared with public markets. Therefore, the
variation in investment strategy among the various investors affects the
stock price, which is difficult to ascertain if the investor-employees do
not have information such as the list of shareholders and the various
terms of the financing rounds.
This Article rejects the view that employees are simply insiders
who already have financial information about the firm and its viability.
Some scholars86 consider employees of start-ups insiders (sometimes
83

See Gornall & Strabulaev, supra note 66.
The U.S. Supreme Court made it clear in Ralston Purina that
employee status, taken alone, does not guarantee access to material
information. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 126 (1953).
85
See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN.
ECON. 305, 309 (1976). For further discussion on agency problems and
strategies to reduce them, see also Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman,
Agency Problems and Legal Strategies, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE
LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH (Reinier H. Kraakman
et al. eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 2009).
86
For a further discussion on employee incentives, see generally Robert
Anderson IV, Employee Incentives and the Federal Securities Laws, 57 U.
84
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they go so far as to consider these employees successful gamblers or
lottery winners) who are well-positioned to monitor their company’s
progress. Such scholars presume that the employees’ economic
incentives are aligned with the those of the founders. Moreover, these
scholars assume that the employees are protected by the bargaining
ability of other sophisticated investors, such as VC investors, who can
sanction the founders for bad behavior. Even if this is true in limited
circumstances (perhaps this theory could work for employees of small
or medium-sized start-ups), it certainly is not true for unicorn
employees.87
There is a conflict of interest between the founders, senior
management and employees. Until recently, the founders of tech firms
were usually diluted (i.e., they had to give up voting control and
economic rights). VC firms negotiated for control over the board of
directors and for the power to fire the founders. Fried and Broughman
showed that Mark Zuckerberg’s example (of a founder maintaining
control over a firm after an IPO) is an exception and not the rule.88
Unicorns are different from small or medium-size start-ups
because they raise large amounts of capital in private mega deals of
$100 million or more from a mixed group of investors, including nontraditional investors. The mega deals allow unicorn founders to prolong
the timeline to IPO or trade sale. These offerings are not registered with
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Alternative venture
capital investors play a major role in contributing to the transition in
equity ownership and capital formation in the U.S. toward models of
private ownership.89 The changes in the incentives and the composition
MIAMI L. REV. 1195, 1217–52 (2003) (discussing the status of employee
options as securities); Matthew T. Bodie, Aligning Incentives with Equity:
Employee Stock Options and Rule 10b-5, 88 IOWA L. REV. 539 (2003)
(focusing on the availability of Rule 10b-5 actions); Smith, supra note 26,
at 589-606 (focusing on the law and economics of equity compensation as
private ordering); Michael C. Jensen & Kevin Murphy, CEO Incentives—
It's Not How Much You Pay, But How, HARV. BUS. REV., May–June 1990,
at 138 (advocating for equity compensation as a form of incentive-based
executive pay); see also Elizabeth Pollman, Private Company Lies, 109
GEO. L.J. 353, 353 (2020) (“[T]he explosive growth of private markets has
left huge portions of U.S. capital markets with relatively light securities
fraud scrutiny and enforcement.”).
87
See also Cable, supra note 41, at 616-17.
88
See Jesse M. Fried & Brian J. Broughman, Do Founders Control
Start-Up Firms that Go Public?, 10 HARV. BUS. REV. 50, 51 (2020).
89
“Capital formation in the United States is currently in the midst of a
significant transition . . . .” IRA M. MILLSTEIN CENTER, COLUMBIA LAW
SCHOOL, PRIVATE OWNERSHIP AT A PUBLIC CROSSROADS: STUDYING THE
RAPIDLY EVOLVING WORLD OF CORPORATE OWNERSHIP (2019).
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of the investor groups give unicorn founders greater power vis-à-vis
preferred shareholders and minority common shareholders to oppose a
sale to keep the company private longer.90 This also means that
employees can no longer be protected by traditional investors who had
the power to sanction the founders for bad behavior.91
With employees having no access to accurate information about
the company, the mere reported but unconfirmed firm valuation can
lead them to take on more risk than anticipated and to pay large
amounts of taxes (for example, on profits that may never materialize).
Moreover, in some cases, employees may be systematically misled by
founders to think that they are rich but in reality might only be rich on
paper. This could result in the employee-investor making the wrong
investment decisions, such as exercising their options prematurely.
There is also always a chance that the value of the unicorn’s common
stock will drop below the strike price, which renders the employee’s
options practically worthless. The employees could end up paying to
work for their company when their stock option profits do not
materialize.92
Employees only benefit from their vested options if their
company goes public. If the company goes public, then they are able to
sell the stock and realize the upside value they helped create.93 But, as
noted, today many unicorn companies remain private while their
employees must pay large sums of money out-of-pocket for the
exercise price and taxes94 on profit that might never in fact
90

See Alon-Beck, supra note 35.
See also Cable, supra note 41, at 616-17.
92
See infra Section V.
93
See BAGLEY & SAVAGE, supra note 76.
94
Federal and state taxes are imposed on exercise of equity options,
even when there is no active market to sell them and such a market might
never materialize. See Richard Lieberman, 2017 Tax Act Impact on
Employee Benefits and Executive Compensation, LEXIS PRAC. ADVISOR
J. (Apr. 18, 2018), https://www.lexisnexis.com/lexis-practice-advisor/thejournal/b/lpa/archive/2018/04/18/2017-tax-act-impact-on-employeebenefits-and-executivecompensation.aspx; see also Client Memorandum,
New Tax Act Provides Tax Deferral Opportunity for Private Company
Equity Compensation Awards, DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP (Jan. 8,
2018),
https://www.davispolk.com/files/2018-0108_tax_act_provides_deferral_opportunity_private_company_equity_com
pensation_awards.pdfhttps://www.davispolk.com/files/2018-0108_tax_act_provides_deferral_opportunity_private_company_equity_com
pensation_awards.pdf [perma.cc/378N-FK2V]; Kathleen Pender, Bills
Would Ease Tax Burden of Private-Company Stock Options, S.F. CHRON.
(Aug.
17,
2016,
5:11
PM),
https://www.sfchronicle.com/business/networth/article/Bills-would-easetax-burden-of-private-company-9157182.php
[perma.cc/7GDT-JMTY];
91
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materialize.95 The value of equity options to employees is
diminished—helping explain why unicorn firms are experiencing
difficulties with attracting, engaging, and retaining talent.96 The longer
the unicorn stays private, the longer the employees are locked in.
III.
THE ROLE
CORPORATE LAW

OF

STOCKHOLDER INSPECTION RIGHTS

IN

Stockholder inspection rights are one of the most powerful
fundamental rights in corporate law. They allow stockholders to inspect
nonpublic company information to mitigate agency problems and
asymmetry of information. Access to nonpublic information allows the
stockholder to protect her economic interests, by making informed
decisions, holding the company fiduciaries accountable and subjecting
them to oversight.
A.
Bargaining Inequality, Asymmetric Information and
Agency Costs
Employees who are stockholders or stock-option holders
experience inequality in bargaining power, which is why the mandatory
inspection rights rules of corporate law are so important and should not
be waived easily. Their firm, employer, has more negotiation power
and can bargain for more favorable terms.97
Tax "Reform" And Its Impact On Stock Compensation, MY STOCK OPTIONS
BLOG
(Dec.
20,
2017),
http://mystockoptions.typepad.com/blog/2017/12/tax-reform-and-itsimpact-on-stock-compensation.html [perma.cc/2RSG-FFZ4].
95
This can also lead to a cash-flow issue for the unicorn firm. The firm
is required to withhold and remit income and employment taxes at the time
of the exercise (NSOs) or vesting (RSUs), but it is not transferring any cash
to the grantee from which it can withhold those amounts. See Scott Belsky,
Don’t Get Trampled: The Puzzle For “Unicorn” Employees, MEDIUM (Jan.
2, 2017), https://medium.com/positiveslope/dont-get-trampled-the-puzzlefor-unicorn-employees8f00f33c784fhttps://medium.com/positiveslope/dont-get-trampled-thepuzzle-for-unicorn-employees-8f00f33c784f [perma.cc/76C3-E9CE].
96
See Andrew Ross Sorkin, How Valuable Is a Unicorn? Maybe Not as
Much as It Claims to Be, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2017),
https://nyti.ms/2yvpuyk [perma.cc/4Y7C-3KAA].
97
How Technology Changes The Balance of Power in The Labor
Market,
GROUNDWORK
COLLABORATIVE
(Oct.
24,
2019),
https://groundworkcollaborative.org/resource/how-technology-changesthe-balance-of-power-in-the-labor-market/; Unequal Power[:] How the
Assumption of Equal Bargaining Power in The Workplace Undermines
Freedom, Fairness, and Democracy, ECON. POLICY INST.,
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Inspection rights are an important tool for stockholders in
privately-held firms for the following reasons. Employees who invest
in their firms and become stockholders, usually experience
fundamental information inadequacies when compared to the founder
(or management) of the firm. There is always uncertainty concerning
the potential or success of the entrepreneur’s product, impact or
research.98 Investment in private firms inherently involves information
asymmetry99 and uncertainty, as well agency problem,100 which
contribute to “adverse selection,” where investors have difficulty with
screening and selecting entrepreneurs.101 The markets for allocating
risk capital to private startups are inefficient.102 Therefore, access to
private nonpublic information is incredibly important to protect
stockholders.
Note that we do not have a separate corporate law for private or
public firms. However, there are fundamental differences between an
owning stock in a publicly-held versus a closely-held corporation. In
https://www.epi.org/unequalpower/home/ (last accessed July 28, 2021); see
Jennifer Riggins, Alphabet Workers Union Tests Tech Industry Appetite for
Unionization, NEWSTACK (Feb. 8, 2021), https://thenewstack.io/alphabetworkers-union-tests-the-appetite-for-tech-industry-unionization/.
98
See PAUL A. GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, THE VENTURE CAPITAL
CYCLE 127 (1999).
99
Laura Lindsey, Blurring Firm Boundaries: The Role of Venture
Capital in Strategic Alliances, 63 J. FIN. 1137 (2008); see also GOMPERS &
LERNER, supra note 132, at 128 (discussing the asymmetric information
problem).
100
See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 107, at 309.
101
See Akerlof, supra note 4; see also Manuel Utset, Reciprocal
Fairness, Strategic Behavior & Venture Survival: A Theory of Venture
Capital Financed Firms, 2002(1) WIS. L. REV. 45, 56 (2002); see also
GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 132, at 129.
102
See GEORGE S. FORD, THOMAS M. KOUTSKY & LAWRENCE J.
SPIWAK, PHOENIX CTR., DISCUSSION PAPER, AN ECONOMIC INVESTIGATION
OF THE VALLEY OF DEATH IN THE INNOVATION SEQUENCE (Aug. 2007)
http://www.osec.doc.gov/ReportValley%20of%20Death%20Funding%20Gap.pdf; see BRANSCOMB &
AUERSWALD, supra note 78; see also AUERSWALD ET AL., supra note 78; see
also Ederyn Williams, Crossing the Valley of Death, INGENGIA, Dec. 30,
2004, at 21, http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/services/ventures/valley.pdf
(discussing valley of death in the U.K.); see also Philipp Marxgut, Interview
with Charles Wessner, Director of the Program on Technology, Innovation,
and Entrepreneurship at the National Academy of Sciences, BRIDGES, Oct.
16, 2008, at 19, http://ostaustria.org/bridges-magazine/volume-19-october16-2008/item/3585-innovation-policy-in-the-us-an-interview-with-charleswessner.
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the public corporation context, if a stockholder is dissatisfied with the
ways in which the firm is managed or with the value of her stock, she
can simply call her stockbroker, or use an app, and sell her stock on the
market. In the private (closely-held) corporation context, the
stockholder is “locked-in” and will typically find it very hard, if not
forbidden by contract, to sell her stock and get liquidity.103 Capital
lock-in refers to a situation where a stockholder is not able to withdraw
or “redeem” the capital that she contributed to the firm freely.104 She
cannot force the firm to distribute assets or buy back her shares.105
An investment in a private firm is therefore inherently risky.
Inspection rights are designed to mitigate some of these information
asymmetry and agency problems. In return for investment capital, the
entrepreneur agrees to disclose credible information about her firm to
the investor, and to continue to disclose such information following the
initial investment, so that the investor will be motivated to remain
invested in the company. This reduces costs. Inspection rights provide
the stockholder with a way to access valuable information about the
private company’s operations and financial performance. An investor
may not have an economic incentive to invest in a private firm, if she
did not have the ability to monitor the entrepreneur and value her
interest in the company.
Employees do not have the same protections or bargaining
powers, such as typical sophisticated investors in startups. VCs can
negotiate for and get voting-control provisions and other inspection
rights. They are represented by lawyers that will probably flag such a
waiver, and not allow their clients to sign such a provision, without
negotiations. Employees typically are not able to negotiate for the same
protections. As explained in greater detail below, the stock option
agreement that employees sign ties them with “golden handcuffs” to
the firm.106 The agreement is designed to attract, engage and retain
103

See Alon-Beck, supra note 6.
See Darian M. Ibrahim, The New Exit in Venture Capital, 65 VAND.
L. REV. 1, 6 (2012). See also Margaret M. Blair, Reforming Corporate
Governance: What History Can Teach Us, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 1, 26
(2004).
105
See Ibrahim, supra note 138. See also Blair, supra note 138, at 14,
26 (citing early corporate charters and statutes that limited withdrawals to
formal corporate dissolution).
106
“Golden handcuffs” refer to benefits that an employer provides to
employees to discourage the employee from taking employment elsewhere.
It should be noted that there is a difference between early and late hires.
These handcuffs do not work for late hires. For more on this, see Alon-Beck,
supra note 6. For turnover in the tech industry, see The Ugly Truth About
Employee Turnover in Silicon Valley, MENLO PARTNERS STAFFING,
104
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employees. Most employees would not be able to bargain away from
the predominant practice of equity incentive plans, because to do so
might send a hostile signal to the market and to their employer, which
they would like to avoid.107
Many employees probably do not understand the risks
associated of owning their company stock (or more accurately,
options), as compared to other types of diversified investment
alternatives. The Zuber example bellow illustrates the risks associated
with exercising stock options while the company is still private, and
moreover the adverse tax effects of such an investment decision. It is
risky to extrapolate past performance into the future, even when
employees work for a large private company that has historically done
well.
Moreover, and more importantly, the problem of inaccurate
unicorn firm valuation is a well-known and documented problem in the
finance literature. This information asymmetry problem is very severe
because it prevents unicorn employees from accurately valuing their
stock options and making informed investment decisions. A decision
on whether to exercise the stock option in order to gain standing in a
potential lawsuit or be able to file a demand with a company to access
stockholder information rights is a financial investment decision. The
unicorn employee does not know if her stock options are worth
anything without access to information.
B.

Zuber Example

To illustrate this predicament imagine you just received a job
offer from a unicorn firm—Zuber. If you accept the offer, you will
receive an annual salary of $200,000 and 100,000 stock options. You
need to figure out exactly how much the Zuber stock options are worth
because a stock option award is different from a straightforward stock
award. Note that as a stock-option-holder, you are not a shareholder
yet. A stock-option-holder merely has an option, which is a contractual
right to purchase a set number of shares in the future. If you accept this
offer, then later on you will need to make an investment decision—i.e.,
a decision to exercise the options and purchase the stock or not.
If Zuber was a publicly-traded company, this decision on
whether to exercise Zuber options would be easy, all you would have
https://mpstaff.com/the-ugly-truth-about-employee-turnover-in-siliconvalley/.
107
See Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious
Power: Law, Norms and the Self Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV.
1619 (2001).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4037705

29
to do is look at Zuber’s stock trading price and decide. But remember,
Zuber is not a publicly-traded firm. Instead, because it is a unicorn, a
privately-held firm, you will not find accurate public information about
Zuber’s share price.
There is always a risk associated with exercising stock options
when the company is private because the stock can be “underwater.”
Underwater means that you paid more for the stock than it is worth
(according to current market price). If the purchase price (the
“exercise”) for the stock option is higher than the market price for the
stock after the company goes public or is acquired, then you will lose
on your investment in the company.
To illustrate this point, let’s return to our hypothetical: if you
received stock options with an exercise price of $6 per share, then you
will pay the company (Zuber) $6 per share to purchase the shares. So,
you will pay $600,000 for 100,000 shares of Zuber. But what if Zuber
decides to go public and, unfortunately for you, the Zuber stock only
trades for $2 per share following the IPO. In this scenario, you paid
more for the shares ($600,000) than they are worth because the market
price is lower ($200,000) than you anticipated. Note that exercising
options will not generate a tax loss (of $400,000). Therefore, as an
employee, you cannot apply this loss against your income. In this
scenario, you basically paid for the privilege of working for Zuber.
Unfortunately, this is not the only or main problem associated
with exercising the options. There are also important and detrimental
tax issues. If you work for Zuber and decide to exercise your options
(or settle your RSUs), then you will have an immediate tax liability.
You will have to pay taxes on profit that might never materialize. It
means that you have to pay out of pocket for both the strike price and
the tax. Many unicorn employees may not be able to raise enough cash
to pay for these expenses because of the high valuations of their
firms.108
108

Exercising incentive stock options can trigger the alternative
minimum tax. See Fundamentals of Equity Compensation, PAYSA,
https://www.paysa.com/resources/fundamentals-of-equity-compensation
[https://perma.cc/DKW3-X9J8] (last visited Aug. 2, 2018). Although
Congress did not repeal the alternative minimum tax, it significantly
increased the income exemption and phase-out amounts, leaving fewer
startup employees who receive stock options subject to the tax. See Six Ways
Tax Reform Affects Your Stock Compensation and Financial Planning,
MYSTOCKOPTIONS.COM,
https://www.mystockoptions.com/articles/index.cfm/ObjectID/22615723D31E-CCDF-68284D3C456C3E3A [https://perma.cc/HJ6Z-ANGT]. There
is a new Internal Revenue Code § 83(i), which allows certain individuals, if
certain conditions are met (such as the underlying stock is eligible stock and
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Unicorns are private firms, and no one really knows what the
future will bring. Their past performance, even if is a solid one, is not
necessarily a good predictor of their future performance. Most rank and
file employees are naïve and should not be considered as insiders for
the purposes of making such an investment decision.109 They do not
have inside information on the firm’s long-term prospects. At some
point, as explain in further detail below, they will need to decide on
whether to exercise or forfeit their options, without a guarantee that
there will be an IPO in the future. Furthermore, unicorn employees do
not have downside protection as common shareholders.
Unicorn employees become common shareholders when they
exercise their options. There are different types of stock, including
common and preferred. What it means to own common shares is that
the Zuber employee, as a common stockholder will be last in line to be
paid in the event of a sale or other types of distribution.110 If Zuber is
sold to another in a fire sale in the future, then it is probable that Zuber
employees will end up with nothing.111 The case of Good Technology
(“Good”) explain this problem of lack of downside protection.112
Good was a successful unicorn firm that ultimately sold in a fire
sale for almost half this value after running into financial distress. News
of the fire sale came as a shock to Good’s employees. One day the
employees, who were common shareholders, basically discovered that
the value of their stock in the firm went down substantially from $4.32
to 44 cents a share.113 The investors, on the other hand, who held onto
the corporation is an eligible corporation), to defer tax liability on the income
earned from exercising options (or settlement of RSUs) for up to five years.
This is intended to mitigate the problem described above concerning NSOs
(and RSUs). For more on this, see Alon-Beck, supra note 6.
109
For more on naïve employees, see Bubb, Corrigan and Warren, who
are criticizing federal retirement plans policy. See Ryan Bubb, Patrick
Corrigan & Patrick L. Warren, A Behavioral Contract Theory Perspective
on Retirement Savings, 47 CONN. L. REV. 1317, 1323 (2015).
110
A sale of a startup is more likely to happen today than an IPO. See
empirical research on this below.
111
For more on the drivers behind value-destroying trade sales, see
Casimiro Nigro & Jörg Stahl, Venture Capital-Backed Firms, Unavoidable
Value-Destroying Trade Sales, and Fair Value Protections (June 1, 2020),
LawFin Working Paper No. 1, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3662441 (they also
suggest an optimal design of a standard corporate contract).
112
See Cable, supra note 41, at 614-16.
113
Matt Levine, Good Technology Wasn't So Good for Employees,
OPINION
(Dec.
23,
2015,
5:35
PM),
BLOOMBERG
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2015-12-23/goodtechnology-wasn-t-so-good-for-employees.
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Good’s preferred share, were able to recover their investment in the
firm and get paid from the sale.114
Prior to the fire sale, several Good employees took on loans to
pay for the taxes to exercise their stock options. These employees never
profited from their investment in the firm because the loan amounts (to
pay for the tax bills) were much larger than what their stock was worth
after the sale. Good is a cautionary tale concerning employees as
investors, who believed in the company and had no idea about its
financial distress.115
To summarize, unicorn employees need access to information
in order to make an informed decision, especially due to the fact that
pre-IPO unicorn valuations are very high. Companies design stock
option plans to allow the company to conserve cash while sharing
ownership with employees and increasing the productivity of the
employees. Additionally, in a recent Delaware case, Riker v. Teucrum
Trading, LLC,116 the Delaware Court of Chancery addressed a demand
for books-and-records by an LLC member, and specifically recognized
that valuation is a well-established statutory proper purpose. Rather,
the focus in the case was on whether the documents requested were
necessary in order to perform a valuation. However, there is still a lot
of uncertainty in this area.
In JUUL, the Delaware Court decided not to decide on whether
a waiver of DGCL Section 220 rights would be enforceable or not.
There is a lot of ambiguity in the case about a potential resolution on
this issue, as noted correctly by a prominent Delaware litigator and
commentator Francis G.X. Pileggi.117 On the one hand, at footnote 14,
the Court provides citations to many Delaware cases that sowed doubt
about the viability of that position–but then the Court also cited cases
at footnote 15 that more generally recognized the ability to waive even
constitutional rights.
This Article highlights the fact that there are important
differences between stock-holders and stock-option-holders
concerning information rights. Only a stockholder in a private company
has a statutory and common law right to access information about the
114

Id.
Tania Babina, Paige Ouimet & Rebecca Zarutskie, Going
Entrepreneurial? IPOs and New Firm Creation (FEDS, Working Paper No.
2017-022), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2940133. Babina et al.’s results
suggest a new potential cost of the IPO that firms should factor into their
IPO decision: losing entrepreneurial-minded employees.
116
Riker v. Teucrum Trading, LLC, C.A. No. 2019-0314-AGB (Del.
Ch. May 12, 2020).
117
See infra Section IV.
115
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company. If a stockholder demands information (i.e., accessing books
and records) but is refused by the company, then it is considered a
violation of the stockholder’s information right, which can be the basis
of a stockholder oppression lawsuit. The stockholder can thus turn to
the courts and seek judicial remedies that were designed specifically to
enforce a stockholder’s information rights.
But, what about stock-option-holders? They do not have this
right or any protection. Therefore, this Article is proposing below an
amendment to the Delaware General Corporation Law, which would
expand the statutory inspection rights under Section 220 to specifically
include stock-option-holders.
C.

The Statutory Design of Stockholder Inspection Rights

Stockholder inspection right originated from the common law
of England. The right was recognized in England as early as 1745.118
The right under English rule was not absolute, but rather had several
restrictions, such as that the shareholder had the right to inspect the
books of the corporation at reasonable times, the inspection had to be
in good faith and for a proper purpose.119 The idea behind this right was
to provide shareholders with disclosures, which can improve efficiency
and reduce information asymmetries.
Many states in the U.S. followed the English courts and
codified this rule in their own statutes and applied it in their case law.120
Twenty four (24) states adopted the Model Business Corporation
Act (“MBCA”), which is a model act prepared by the Committee on
Corporate Laws of the Section of Business Law of the American Bar
Association. According to Section 16.02 of the MBCA, inspection
rights are mandatory immutable rules of law, which means that they
cannot be waived by the parties like default rules.121
118

See Dominus Rex v. Fraternity of Hostmen in Newcastle-Upon-Tyne
2 Str. 1223, 93 Eng. Rep. 1144 (K.B. 1745). The early English case of
Dominus Rex was one of the first cases to recognize the right of stockholders
to inspect corporate books. See William T. Blackburn, Shareholder
Inspection Rights, 12 SW. L.J. 61 (1958).
119
See Blackburn, supra note 152.
120
See JONES DAY, THE TOOLS AT HAND: INSPECTION OF CORPORATE
RECORDS,
https://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/70e4b38e-e3e94718-b4c9-a04247277901/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/f45072081c42-4add-a976-1dd7735d526e/ToolsAtHand.pdf
121
See also Geis, supra note 11, at 429 (questioning the ability of states
that adopted the MBCA to allow parties to contact around this provision).
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The Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA) Section 16.02
includes the following language on shareholder inspection:122
“The right of inspection granted by this section may not
be abolished or limited by a corporation’s articles of
incorporation or bylaws.”123
Not surprisingly, Delaware did not adopt the MBCA, but rather
codified its own comparable version of inspection rights. Many courts
today look to Delaware case law when they are required to interpret
inspection rights according to their own statutes.124
Section 220 of the Delaware General Corporation Law
(“DGCL”) also balances the rights of stockholders and management.
On the one hand, it provides important protections to stockholders by
allowing them to exercise their ownership rights and inspect the books
and records of a Delaware corporation. On the other, it also protects the
firm and management. DGCL Section 220 is not an absolute right.
There are hurdles. A shareholder that wants access to information must
have standing and proper purpose.
The inspection right is not absolute due to the understanding
that there is a need to protect the firm from frivolous or meritorious
lawsuits, and to protect the firm’s proprietary information. To have
standing in court, the employee, as a shareholder, must first overcome
the following hurdles.
1.

Standing - Shareholder of Record Requirement

To have standing in court, the employee has to be a shareholder
of record. As noted, owning stock options does not qualify the
employee as a shareholder. Rather, the employee must first exercise her
122
123

MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 16.02(F) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
It should be noted that according to comment 1 to MBCA § 7.32, “a

provision of a shareholder agreement that limited inspection rights under section
16.02 or the right to financial statements under section 16.20 might, as a general
matter, be valid.” There are situations where shareholders can waive inspection
rights in shareholder agreements according to this provision, as long as it is not
against public policy. This Article supports the view that do so in a stock option
agreement, where the option holder is not yet a shareholder and might not be
aware this waiver is against public policy. See also Fisch, supra note 14.
124

See JONES DAY, supra note 154. See Arctic Fin. Corp. v. OTR
Express, Inc., 72 Kan. 1326, 1331, 38 P.3d 701, 703 (Kan. 2002); see also
Danzinger v. Luse, 815 N.E.2d 658 (Ohio 2004).
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options (after they vest), buy the shares and only then she becomes a
shareholder (and thus become eligible to demand to inspect her
employer’s books and records). Founders and investors usually get
outright stock in the company, whereas startup employees get stock
options.
Stock-option-holders do not have standing under Section 220,
unless they become shareholders. The decision to exercise the options
and become a stockholder is problematic without access to information
for the following reasons. There is always a great economic risk
associated with exercising stock options when the company is private.
This risk arises because of asymmetry of information and uncertainty.
Unicorn employees at many of the largest private (but secretive)
startups across the country are uninformed about their rights, their
firm’s equity structure, or its overall finances, and thus should not be
treated as traditional insiders.125 In the economic literature, employees
who are insiders are compared to gamblers or lottery winners, who have
access to information and are well-positioned to monitor their
company’s progress.126 Under these theories, the insiders’ economic
incentives are aligned with those of the founders’, which is not the case
for unicorn employees, as illustrated below.
Employees that work for a small sized startup can very well be
regarded as insiders who have information on the operations and status
of the firm. Unicorn employees, on the hand, work for very large, even
quasi-public companies with thousands of employees.127 They are not
necessarily privy to nonpublic information on the firm’s performance.
Additionally, as investors in private firms, they are locked-in and do
not have a way of disciplining the firm’s managers by threatening to
withdraw their capital from the firm, which further contributes to
governance problems within the firm.128
125

A unicorn is a large privately held venture-capital (“VC”) backed
company that is valued at over $1 billion (a “unicorn”). For more on naïve
employees, see Bubb, Corrigan and Warren, supra note 143, who criticize
federal retirement plans policy.
126
For a further discussion on employee incentives, see generally
Anderson, supra note 108 (discussing the status of employee options as
securities); Bodie, supra note 108 (focusing on the availability of Rule 10b5 actions); Smith, supra note 26 (focusing on the law and economics of
equity compensation as private ordering); and Jensen & Murphy, supra note
108 (advocating for equity compensation as a form of incentive-based
executive pay).
127
See also Cable, supra note 41, at 616-17.
128
See Larry E. Ribstein, Should History Lock in Lock-in?, 41 TULSA
L. REV. 523, 524–25 (2006); see also Darian M. Ibrahim, supra note 138,
at 6-7.
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2.
Proper
Requirement

Purpose

-

The

“Demonstration”

Proper purpose is another hurdle that is rooted in common law
tradition. Even if the employee becomes a shareholder of record after
exercising her stock options, the inspection right is not absolute but
rather conditional. After exercising her options, the employee who
became a new shareholder must “demonstrate a proper purpose for
making such a demand.” The DGCL statute defines a “proper purpose”
as “a purpose reasonably related to such person's interest as a
stockholder.”
Until recently, it was not clear whether an employeeshareholder could establish a proper purpose when that purpose is to
ascertain the value of her stock. However, Delaware Vice Chancellor
Travis Laster in Woods v. Sahara Enterprises, Inc., clarified that a
stockholder demanding corporate records under Section 220 is not
required to explain why the stockholder wants to value her interest in
the company to satisfy the recognized proper purpose of valuation.129
The court also provided a list of “proper purposes” that can be
shown to satisfy Section 220 which included “to ascertain the value of
his stock”.130 The Delaware Supreme Court in Lebanon Cnty. Emps.
Ret. Fund v. Amerisource Bergen Corp., clarified the circumstances in
which stockholders are entitled to demand books and records.131 This
decision further suggests an inclination by Delaware courts to permit
plaintiffs (who are stockholders) to use Section 220 to get “pre-lawsuit”
discovery, even if it seems that there is no credible basis to believe there
are actionable claims.132 While Amerisource involved attempts to
investigate allegations of mismanagement, the usage as “pre-lawsuit”
discovery was not limited to such a purpose.
129

See Woods v. Sahara Enters., Inc., C.A. No. 2020-0153-JTL, slip op.
at 11, 14-15 (Del. Ch. July 22, 2020). Additionally, according to the decision
in Amerisource, stockholders may state broader purposes for investigations
under section 220. Lebanon Cnty. Emps’ Ret. Fund v. AmerisourceBergen
Corp., C.A. No. 2019-0527, 2020 WL 132752 (Del. Ch. 2020).
130
See Woods, slip op. at 8-9.
131
If a stockholder seeks to investigate credible allegations of
mismanagement, they have to meet a low bar.
132
Roger A. Cooper, Mark E. McDonald, Pascale Bibi & Kal
Blassberger, Delaware Supreme Court Clarifies Section 220’s “Proper
Purpose”
Test,
CLEARY
GOTTLIEB
(Dec.
16,
2020),
https://www.clearymawatch.com/2020/12/delaware-supreme-courtclarifies-section-220s-proper-purpose-test/.
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Additionally, there are new Delaware court decisions that have
clarified the different types of documents that may be obtained under a
Section 220 demand, which include, in limited circumstances, even
communications such as personal emails or text messages.133 No
surprisingly, these is an increase in the number of Section 220 demands
in recent years. The more stockholders use this investigation tool, the
more potential for stockholders to file derivative lawsuits against
directors and officers.
These developments perhaps encourage corporate attorneys to
innovate, take advantage of bargaining inequality and put limits on
information rights of certain stockholders - employees. Lawyers are
paid to come up with new ways and practices to protect their clients,
which are the firm and its management team. Thanks to cases like
Domo and Woods, corporate lawyers who represent unicorn firms,
decided to innovate with a new practice—one that compels employees
to waive their inspection rights under Section 220 as a condition to
receiving stock options from the company.
D.

Exploitation and Market Power

There are benefits and costs associated with disclosure, which
affect the cost of capital when there is information assymetry.134 If
private firms choose to disclose information to their stockholders
generally, it reduces the information assymetry between the
stockholders (investors) and managers, which also reduces the cost of
capital. It improves the liquidity of the stock and contributes to more
demand from other investor groups.
Information is power and disclosure is very important to
unicorn firms. Our intellectual property laws do not protect valuable
tacit knowledge (as opposed to formal, codified or explicit knowledge).
Tech companies cannot easily use patent or trade secret, for example,
in a way to prevent or deter imitation of tacit knowledge. Additionally,
the current market dynamics lead to concentration in the economy (in
tech digital industry). There is a decline in competition in the
technology sector. Both public and private larger tech firms, are taking
advange of these market conditions to weaken competition and
leverage their dominant position to strengthen their hold on the market.
133

See KT4 Partners LLC v. Palantir Techs. Inc., No. 281, 2018, C.A.
No. 2017-0177-JRS (Del. Jan. 29, 2019).
134
Douglas W. Diamond & Robert E. Verrecchia, Disclosure, Liquidity,
and the Cost of Capital, 46(4) J. FIN. 1325 (1991).
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Unicorns are spending a lot of resources to keep information
private. Leakage of proprietary information about the firm can be used
by the firm’s competitors and hurt the firm’s competitive advantage.
Unicorn firms, which are leading large tech companies, spend a lot of
resources on innovation, new technology and secrecy to maintain their
market dominance. Such firms are very protective of financial and
other proprietary information about their business affairs. Unicorns
generally do not disclose this sort of information to anyone except for
major stockholders, who are able to protect their interests and
specifically negotiate for contractual provisions such as for exit or
voice.
Tech employees are the human capital that contributes to the
knowledge in the firm. Tech firms have an incentive to protect their
knowledge resources from imitation by others, because it helps the firm
to generate rents from this valuable knowledge. One of the most
common ways for leakage to competitors is through employee mobility
across firms.135
There are several ways to protect knowledge leakage when
employees leave to go work for a competing firm, such as nondisclosure agreements (NDAs) and non-compete agreements
(NCAs).136 However, in practice, the enforcements of these contractual
arrangements depend on the geographic location and the court’s
willingness. It is also very hard to enforce and detect knowledge
spillover using these contractual arrangements, especially in innovation
clusters, such as Silicon Valley, where a court might not be willing to
enforce these arrangements. Therefore, corporate lawyers had to
innovate and come up with another mechanism. The stock option
agreement is designed to retain the employee, so that the employee does
not have an incentive to compete with the firm or leave for a
competitor.

135

Almeida, 1996; Almeida and Kogut, 1999; Rosenkopf and Almeida,

2003.
136

ALAN HYDE, WORKING IN SILICON VALLEY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL
ANALYSIS OF A HIGH-VELOCITY LABOR MARKET (2003); KANNAN
SRIKANTH, ANAND NANDKUMAR, PRASHANT KALE & DEEPA MANI, THE
ROLE OF ORGANIZATIONAL MECHANISMS IN PREVENTING LEAKAGE OF
UNPATENTED KNOWLEDGE (2015); M. Marx, The Firm Strikes Back: NonCompete Agreements and the Mobility of Technical Professionals, 76(5)
AM. SOCIO. REV. 695 (2011); M. Marx, D. Strumsky & L. Fleming,
Mobility, Skills, and the Michigan Non-Compete Experiment, 55(6) MGMT.
SCI. 875 (2009); see ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE:
CULTURE AND COMPETITION IN SILICON VALLEY AND ROUTE 128 (1996).
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There is a difference between insider and outside investor
groups. It is not clear if unicorn founders trust major stockholders
(preferred stockholders) to protect information. It is more likely that
founders are compelled to disclose some information in order to induce
investment in the firm. It all depends on the bargaining power of the
founders and investors. Sophisticated accredited investors, such as VCs
or alternative VCs, have bargaining power, conduct due-diligence
(investigation) prior to investment, and hence decide on whether to use
“voice” (voting rights) or demand exit (aggressive redemption rights)
when investing in unicorns. They are not only sophisticated players,
but also likely represented by lawyers. They can use their power to
engage with the management to try to institute change.137
Depending on the group of outside investors in question, there
are different contractual provisions associated with the investments in
the unicorns. The parties’ incentives can vary and are depended on
timing of financing round, participating investors and performance of
the startup.138 VC investors typically invest in earlier rounds than other
alternative VC investors, and bargain for preferred stock, extensive
control rights and control of the start-up’s board of directors.139 I find
it hard to believe that such sophisticated investors would be willing to
sign a waiver of statutory inspection rights. I was not able to find any
evidence of such practice.
Employees are not sophisticated represented investors. Startup
founders and their lawyers have found a new way to abuse equity award
information asymmetry to their benefit when dealing with employees –
waiver of inspection rights. Inspection rights waivers are especially
detrimental to minority common stockholders, such as employees, who
are usually not represented, but still required to make an investment
decision, such as exercise their stock, or leave and compete with the
firm. Since employees are minority shareholders, there are not only
serious agency problem, but also a conflict of interest between majority
137

See Alon Brav, Wei Jiang & Hyunseob Kim, Hedge Fund Activism:
A
Review
2
(Working
Paper,
2010),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1947049&download=
yes, on institutional engagement. See Alex Edmans & Clifford Holderness,
Blockholders: A Survey of Theory and Evidence, in HANDBOOK OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (Benjamin Hermalin & Mike Weisbach eds.,
2017); see also Joseph McCahery, Zacharias Sautner & Laura Starks,
Behind the Scenes: The Corporate Governance Preferences of Institutional
Investors, 71 J. FIN. 2905 (2016).
138
Alon-Beck, supra note 35.
139
Jesse M. Fried & Mira Ganor, Agency Costs of Venture Capitalist
Control in Startups, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 967, 970 n.9 (2006) (“preferred stock
offers investors more senior rights than does common stock. Most
importantly, preferred stockholders have a ‘liquidation preference”).
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and minority common shareholders, which now plagues the corporate
governance system in unicorn firms.
In the past, both startup founders and rank and file employees
used to belong to the same class of common shareholders. Their
incentives were aligned. These days, however, founders of unicorn
firms are able to negotiate for other, more powerful, contractual
arrangements thanks to market changes and investments from
alternative and VC investors. For example, in Unicorn Stock Options,
and Alternative Venture Capital, I shed light on these new practices.
Founders are able to control the board of directors thanks to super
voting rights and other types of contractual arrangements. These new
arrangements enhance the power of founders within the firm at the
expense of other employees. As a direct result of these developments,
the interests of the employees and founders as common shareholders
are not aligned anymore.
Unicorn founders choose to stay private to have more control
over the firm, protect their proprietary information, keep it secret, and
prevent leakages to competitors.140 Founders also have an incentive to
avoid the high costs associated with employee turnover. Tech
employees are skilled labor, and as such, they are in high demand.
There is currently a shortage in talent in the global markets. This
shortage in talented employees is expected to become more acute in
coming years.141
Tech companies limit leakage of information, so that they can
continue to maintain their market power, dominance and crush
competition, which raises the barriers to entry for small firms. There
are several geographic tech regions in the United States, but the most
known ones are Silicon Valley around San Francisco and Route 128 in
Boston. These areas enjoy concentrated technology development and
access to capital. This success can be attributed to several factors,
See Zohar Goshen & Assaf Hamdani, Corporate Control and
Idiosyncratic Vision, 125 YALE L.J. 563 (2016) (“entrepreneurs value
corporate control because it allows them to pursue their vision”). See also
Zohar Goshen & Assaf Hamdani, Corporate Control, Dual Class, and the
Limits of Judicial Review, 120(4) COLUMBIA L.R. 941 (2020) (they show
that “reallocation of control rights raises an inevitable tradeoff between
investors’ protection from agency costs and the controller’s ability to pursue
its idiosyncratic vision, making the value of different allocations of control
rights both firm-specific and individual-specific.”).
141
Pedro Nicolaci da Costa, Tech Talent Scramble, Global Competition
for a Limited Pool of Technology Workers Is Heating Up, INT’L MONEY
FUND
(Mar.
2019),
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2019/03/global-competitionfor-technology-workers-costa.htm.
140
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including robust investment in research and development efforts,
availability of government funding, strong linkages between academic
institutions and industry, developed risk-capital networks,
complementary infrastructure of suppliers (for example specialized law
firms), and last but not least – a ruthless code of secrecy.142 There are
many urban legends about retribution for employees who break the
code of secrecy.143
It is not surprising that unicorn firms have come up with this
new practice to limit stockholder inspection rights. The following is a
description of the rise in use of this new contractual innovation, its wide
adoption and practice.
IV.

THE INVENTION OF STOCKHOLDER INSPECTION WAIVERS

Tech founders may claim that keeping their financial
information private—even from their own minority stockholders—
prevents the information from falling into rival hands. They may also
claim that the lack of public scrutiny also gives them freedom to invest
for the long-term. However, with regards to employees, employees
used to have a right to information under our securities laws. Today,
unicorns rely on regulatory arbitrage, a new exemption under our
securities laws, specifically Rule 701, to avoid providing their
employees with disclosure of information.144
The following is an investigation of the factors that contributed
the rise in the use of waivers.
A.

SEC Continues to Ease Disclosure Obligations

Initially, our securities laws were designed to protect all
investors, including employees as investors. That meant that all the
companies in the U.S. were required to disclose financial and other
142

See BRANSCOMB & AUERSWALD, supra note 78.
Olivia Solon, ‘They'll Squash You Like a Bug’: How Silicon Valley
Keeps a Lid on Leakers, GUARDIAN (Mar. 16, 2018),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/mar/16/silicon-valleyinternal-work-spying-surveillance-leakers.
144
Thanks to Rule 701, unicorns are not required to provide employees
with enhanced information, especially concerning the risks associated with
investing in illiquid securities of a high-risk venture that is often controlled
by founders who lack management experience.
143

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4037705

41
information about the offering firm, prior to offering securities to the
public. Our laws, specifically the Securities Act of 1933 (the
“Securities Act”), required that a company that offers to sell its
securities must first register the securities with the SEC. During the
registration process, the issuing company disclosed certain facts,
including certified financial statements, a description of its assets and
business operations, management composition and more.
Things changed. Startups today enjoy several exemptions from
registration. Thanks to a series of reforms to the federal securities laws,
which began in 1988.145 What should private companies disclose?
There are several approaches to disclosure. There is consensus that
there is a need for more disclosure. According to Yifat Aran, they
include a maximalist, minimalist, and intermediate approach.146
We need a better disclosure regime to “prevent the market for
equity-based compensation from becoming a market for lemons.”147
Aran warns that employees will lose trust in equity compensation
arrangements. This is already happening, as evident from employees
complaining on public platforms such as Glassdoors and PaySa.148
Some employees as shareholders turn to the courts for help.
B.

Workers Go to Court

145

See Renee M. Jones, Professor of Law and Associate Dean for
Academic Affairs, Boston College Law School, Written Testimony Before
the H. Fin. Servs. Comm., Subcomm. on Inv. Prot., Entrepreneurship, and
Cap.
Mkts.
(Sept.
11,
2019),
https://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg-116-ba16-wstatejonesr-20190911.pdf (citing Alon-Beck, supra note 6).
146
It should be noted that there are several views in academia and
practice on the type of information that should be provided to employees.
According to Aran, I represent the maximalist approach (for more, see AlonBeck, supra note 6), practitioners represent a minimalist one, and Aran
proposes an intermediate approach to the regulation of disclosures to startup employees. See Aran, supra note 55, Making Disclosure Work for StartUp Employees.
147
See Anat Alon-Beck, Unicorn Stock Options; See also Aran, supra
note 55, Making Disclosure Work for Start-Up Employees.
148
These sites rank the “Best Companies to Work For” and employees
pay “careful attention . . . to Employee Engagement Scores that link
corporate reputation, employee motivation, and productivity.” Samuelson,
supra note 101. Unicorn employee complaints are not private anymore, as
the “conversation has moved to employee hangouts, both virtual and real, to
interview rooms on college campuses, and to public conversations about
Board diversity, the glass ceiling, and in the talent pool.” Id.
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Employees are now turning to the courts to gain access to
information on their company. Why courts? To invoke their statutory
shareholder inspection rights.149 Lawyers are familiar with a little
secret—shareholders can make a demand on the company to inspect
the books and records, and when the company refuses, they turn to
courts.
In Delaware, DGCL Section 220 provides protection to
stockholders by allowing them to exercise their ownership rights and
inspect the books and records of a Delaware corporation. In Cedarview
Opportunities Master Fund v. Spanish Broad. Sys., Inc., Delaware
court held that this ownership right “cannot be eliminated or limited by
a provision in a corporation’s certificate of incorporation.” But, there
is ambiguity in the case law about waiving these rights by contract.
Can employees (who are not yet stockholders) waive this right
by entering into a contract with the corporation such as a stock option
agreement? And, in the event of litigation, would a Delaware court side
with management or employees? The Delaware Court of Chancery has
yet to answer these questions.
One of the first cases before the Delaware Chancery was
Biederman vs. Domo (“Domo”). Domo is a business intelligence and
data visualization company, which was private at the time. On January
26, 2017, the Wall Street Journal reported that Jay Biederman—a
former employee and minority shareholder—finally compelled the
company to open up its books.150 Biederman used an “obscure”
Delaware law, Section 220, to inspect Domo’s books and records.151

149
See James D. Cox, Kenneth J. Martin & Randall S. Thomas, The
Paradox of Delaware’s ‘Tools at Hand’ Doctrine: An Empirical
Investigation (Duke Law School Public Law & Legal Theory Series No.
2019-20 (2019); Vanderbilt Law Research Paper No. 19-10 (2019);
European Corporate Governance Institute – Law Working Paper No
498/2020 (2019)), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3355662.
150
See BLASI, KRUSE & BERNSTEIN, supra note 6. See Sean Kelly, StartUp Hauled to Court over Secret Stock Value, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV.
(Aug. 18 2016), https://www.courthousenews.com/start-up-hauled-to-courtover-secret-stock-value/
(“According to a complaint filed August 15 in Delaware state court,
Biederman owns over 64,000 shares of Domo Inc. after his stock options
vested and he purchased the options under an employee incentive plan for
32 cents per share. But Biederman says just days after he requested
information about the stock’s worth, he was fired. And then the stonewalling
began, the complaint says.”).
151
Rolfe Winkler, Former Employee Wins Legal Feud to Open Up
Startup's
Books,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Jan.
26,
2017),
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Biederman wanted information to value of his holdings. He was
refused, laid off, and had to litigate with Domo for over a year.
Biederman received stock options under his company’s employee stock
incentive plan. He exercised those options, and became a shareholder,
by purchasing over 64,000 shares after his options vested. Therefore,
Biederman was both a shareholder and stock-option-holder. He wanted
to review Domo’s financial statements to value his position in the
company. Domo was a private company at the time and was not
required to disclose its financial information to the public. Despite the
fact that it raised over $1 billion dollars and joined the unicorn club, it
is not clear whether its valuation was aggressive or justified.152
Domo was a unicorn firm that stayed private for long periods of
time while avoiding public disclosures that would reveal its financial
conditions and fair market value. Domo, like other unicorn firms, is
also known for its “exaggerated valuations.” 153 Prior to its IPO, Domo
was valued as high as $2 billion, which means that immediately
following the IPO, about 75 percent of that value (compared to the
valuation) was erased.154 According to Gornall & Strabulaev, Domo
was overvalued by 16-17%.155 This example illustrates why it is critical

https://www.wsj.com/articles/former-employee-wins-legal-feud-to-openup-startups-books-1485435602.
152
David Trainer, Domo Richly Priced at Post-IPO Market Value,
FORBES
(July
3,
2018),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2018/07/03/domo-richlypriced-at-current-market-value-after-ipo/#36a9a78f4da8.
153
There are new research studies that examine the fair market value of
startups worth over $1 billion. Gornall & Strebulaev find huge discrepancies
in their purported worth. See Gornall & Strebulaev, supra note 66. On the
skepticism about unicorn reported valuations, see also Robert P. Bartlett, III,
A Founder’s Guide to Unicorn Creation: How Liquidation Preferences in
M&A Transactions Affect Start-up Valuation, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS 123 (Claire A. Hill & Steven D. Solomon eds.,
2016) (“achieving unicorn status provides a firm with added visibility to
prospective employees and customers, giving it a potential competitive
advantage over rival firms.”); see also Sarah Frier & Eric Newcomer, The
Fuzzy, Insane Math That’s Creating So Many Billion-Dollar Tech
Companies, BLOOMBERG TECH. (Mar. 17, 2015), 9:00 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-17/the-fuzzy-insanemath-that-s-creating-so-many-billion-dollar-tech-companies
(“investors
agree to grant higher valuations, which help the companies with recruitment
and building credibility”); Fan, supra note 41; Cable, supra note 41.
154
TechCrunch, https://techcrunch.com/2018/06/29/domo-opens-at-23-80share-a-pop-of-13-after-raising-193m-valuing-the-company-at-around-510m/
155

See Gornall & Strebulaev, supra note 66.
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that employees have access to real data, not just exaggerated valuations
put out by company leadership.156
During the Domo litigation, Vice Chancellor Sam Glasscock III
of the Delaware Court of Chancery ruled against the company and
ordered Domo to provide Biederman with audited financial reports.
The Court stated: “There is no question that
valuation is a proper purpose under Section 220,
particularly in a corporation like this which is not
particularly transparent. A stockholder is entitled to
value his shares.” The Court ordered that “three years of
audited financials” was sufficient to this proper
purpose.
The decision came after many months of media scrutiny in
which The Wall Street Journal repeatedly reported on Domo’s refusal
to provide Biederman with financial records. The Domo case was
celebrated by the press as a win to employees.
The publicity of this case and other cases mentioned below
inspired a wave of articles, law-firm memos and client alerts on the
ability to waive inspection rights.157 Moreover, leading law firms,
acting through the National Venture Capital Association (“NVCA”),
added provisions to existing contracts to thwart the Domo effects.158

C.

Contractual Innovation

Despite its initial promise, Domo had an unintended
consequence for employee stock-option-holders and employee
stockholders. In order to avoid disclosing information to employees,
unicorns adopted a waiver of statutory stockholder inspection rights.
156

See Gornall & Strebulaev, supra note 66.

157

https://www.hg.org/legal-articles/shareholder-litigation-to-obtaincorporate-books-and-records-to-value-company-and-investigate-wrongdoing53037;
https://www.foundersworkbench.com/founders-alert-be-aware-ofstockholder-inspection-rights/; https://ma-litigation.sidley.com/2021/03/caninspection-rights-be-waived-some-observations-on-delaware-law/;
https://www.deallawyers.com/blog/2021/03/books-records-can-inspectionrights-be-waived-in-delaware.html;
https://danashultz.com/2018/11/05/delaware-stockholders-waive-inspection/;
https://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/insights/publications/2020/08/delaware-courtof-chancery-internal-affairs-doctrine-bars-stockholder/;
158
See infra … Section …
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Many tech companies are now requiring their employees to sign
a waiver provision entitled, “Waiver of Statutory Information Rights,”
which states:
Waiver of Statutory Information Rights. Purchaser
acknowledges and understands that, but for the waiver made
herein, Purchaser would be entitled, upon written demand under
oath stating the purpose thereof, to inspect for any proper
purpose, and to make copies and extracts from, the Company’s
stock ledger, a list of its stockholders, and its other books and
records, and the books and records of subsidiaries of the
Company, if any, under the circumstances and in the manner
provided in Section 220 of the Delaware General Corporation
Law (any and all such rights, and any and all such other rights
of Purchaser as may be provided for in Section 220, the
“Inspection Rights”). In light of the foregoing, until the first
sale of Common Stock of the Company to the general public
pursuant to a registration statement filed with and declared
effective by the Securities and Exchange Commission under the
Securities Act of 1933, as amended, Purchaser hereby
unconditionally and irrevocably waives the Inspection Rights,
whether such Inspection Rights would be exercised or pursued
directly or indirectly pursuant to Section 220 or otherwise, and
covenants and agrees never to directly or indirectly commence,
voluntarily aid in any way, prosecute, assign, transfer, or cause
to be commenced any claim, action, cause of action, or other
proceeding to pursue or exercise the Inspection Rights. The
foregoing waiver applies to the Inspection Rights of Purchaser
in Purchaser’s capacity as a stockholder and shall not affect any
rights of a director, in his or her capacity as such, under Section
220. The foregoing waiver shall not apply to any contractual
inspection rights of Purchaser under any written agreement with
the Company.
This waiver illustrates that unicorn employees who sign this
waiver are oppressed because they do not have access to information
about the risk of exercising their stock options or the valuation of their
company, even if they later exercise their options and become
stockholders. This is true until and unless the company decides to go
public.
Most employees are unable to bargain away from this practice.
If they wanted to do so, most employees would have to refuse equity
incentive plans altogether, and to do so might send a hostile signal to
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the market and to their employer that they would probably like to
avoid.159
This practice is gaining momentum. Relying on a data set of the
SEC’s public filings for companies that filed an IPO prior to and
following Domo, I found many examples of companies that are using
this new language. That is why the results in Table 2 below are not
surprising. I also found that a few companies started using the “Waiver
of Statutory Information Rights,” immediately after the enactment of
the JOBS Act in 2012. The following findings make note of the timing
following the 2012 JOBS Act and Domo.

Number of Corporations Adopting
Waivers of Statutory Information Rights
Over Time
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Table 2. The Number of Corporations Adopting Waivers of
Statutory Information Rights Over Time.
The line graph shows the yearly number of filings that included
a waiver between 2012 (when the waiver first appeared) and 2020. The
line graph also notes the timing between the 2012 JOBS Act and the
Domo case to show the change over time. I found that the waiver
became popular following the Domo case, possibly due to all the
financial press coverage, and the publication of client alerts by large
law firms.
Delaware has to make a decision on this issue soon. In a recent
case, JUUL Labs, Inc. v. Grove (“JUUL”), the Delaware court noted
that it was not deciding whether waivers of a stockholder’s statutory
inspection rights under Section 220 in JUUL Labs’ form agreements
would be enforceable. That being said, the court almost deliberately
left this question open for further deliberation.
159

See Rock & Wachter, supra note 141; Also, see Schwab Study, supra

note 21.
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There is perhaps a plausible reason for this “uncertainty.” On
the one hand, we have, in my opinion, a very clear situation of a
mandatory law that should not be contracted around.160 On the other
hand, in recent years, Delaware courts and the legislature have been
recognizing the ability to waive statutory and even constitutional
rights.161
160
JUUL Labs, Inc. v. Grove, No. 2020-005-JTL (Del. Ch. Aug. 13,
2020). The Delaware Court in footnote 14 of the JUUL case cited the
following cases that state that the parties cannot waive inspection rights:
“See State v. Penn-Beaver Oil Co., 143 A. 257, 260 (Del. 1926) (“[T]he
provision in defendant’s charter which permits the directors to deny any
examination of the company’s records by a stockholder is unauthorized and
ineffective.”); Marmon v. Arbinet-Thexchange, Inc., 2004 WL 936512, at
*5 (Del. Ch. Apr. 28, 2004) (“Nor could they rely upon a certificate
provision prohibiting disclosure to avoid a shareholder’s inspection right
conferred by statute.”); BBC Acq. Corp. v. Durr-Fillauer Med., Inc., 623
A.2d 85, 90 (Del. Ch. 1992) (holding that a contract with a third party could
not be used to limit inspection rights, which “cannot be abridged or
abrogated by an act of the corporation”); Loew’s Theaters, Inc. v.
Commercial Credit Co., 243 A.2d 78, 81 (Del. Ch. 1968) (holding that
charter provision which limited inspection rights to holder of 25% of shares
was void as conflicting with statute); State ex rel. Healy v. Superior Oil
Corp., 13 A.2d 453, 454 (Del. Super. Ct. 1940) (“In Delaware it has been
considered that the right of a stockholder to examine the books of the
company is a common law right and can only be taken away by statutory
enactment.”); State v. Loft, Inc., 156 A. 170, 173 (Del. Ch. 1931) (following
Penn-Beaver).” Id. at 24 n.14.
161
In footnote 15 of the JUUL case, the Delaware court cited to the
following cases that recognized the ability to waive not only inspection
rights but even constitutional rights. “See Baio v. Commercial Union Ins.
Co., 410 A.2d 502, 508 (Del. 1979) (“Clearly, our legal system permits one
to waive even a constitutional right . . . and, a fortiori, one may waive a
statutory right.”) (citations omitted); see, e.g., Graham v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 565 A.2d 908, 913 (Del. 1989) (holding that an arbitration
clause in a contract effectuated a valid waiver of the constitutional right to a
jury trial); Manti Hldg., LLC v. Authentix Acq. Co., 2019 WL 3814453, at
*4 (Del. Ch. Aug. 14, 2019) (concluding “that waiver of appraisal rights is
permitted under Delaware law, as long as the relevant contractual provisions
are clear and unambiguous”); Tang Capital P’rs, LP v. Norton, 2012 WL
3072347, at *7 (Del. Ch. July 27, 2012) (holding that the plaintiff
contractually waived its rights to seek a receivership under Section 291 of
the DGCL); Libeau v. Fox, 880 A.2d 1049, 1056 (Del. Ch. 2005) (holding
that the plaintiff waived her right to statutory partition by contract, noting
that “[b]ecause it is a statutory default provision, it is unsurprising that the
absolute right to partition might be relinquished by contract, just as the right
to invoke § 273 to end a joint venture or to seek liquidation may be waived
in the corporate context”); Red Clay Educ. Ass’n v. Bd. of Educ. of Red Clay
Consol. Sch. Dist., 1992 WL 14965, at *6 (Del. Ch. Jan. 16, 1992) (holding
that a provision in a collective bargaining agreement constituted an effective
waiver of negotiation right under unfair labor practices statute). The Kortum
decision, cited above, held that a bilateral agreement had not waived
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D.

Mandatory Rules & Private Ordering

Despite the fact that different states have different corporate
laws, all these laws have something in common—each has a set of
default and immutable rules, respectively. States adopted these
corporate law rules to make the incorporation process easier, cheaper,
and more efficient. The “default” or “gap-filling” rules adopted by
states give parties a choice. They can choose to use any of the default
rules when setting up a company.
The rules are standardized and meant to save the parties on
transaction costs that are associated with setting up a company. Default
means that the parties can alter these rules or contract around them by
using other specific language in the agreements that they enter into with
each other.
Immutable rules, on the other hand, are mandatory rules—ones
the parties cannot contract around. Section 220 of the DGCL, for
example, is a mandatory rule. Distinguishing between default and
immutable rules is attributed to the contrarian view of corporate law,162
which is part of the law and economics view that regards corporate
entities as a “nexus of contracts.” The prominent supporters (and
perhaps intellectual founders) of this view are Judge Frank Easterbrook
and Professor Daniel Fischel, as well as Professors Michael Jensen and
William Meckling.163

statutory inspection rights where the waiver was not “clearly and
affirmatively” expressed. See Kortum, 769 A.2d at 125; accord Schoon v.
Troy Corp., 2006 WL 1851481, at *2 (Del. Ch. June 27, 2006). Perhaps even
a clear and express waiver would be contrary to public policy under PennBeaver and its progeny, but the standard set forth in Kortum, at minimum,
implies that a stockholders’ agreement could waive statutory inspection
rights if the waiver was sufficiently clear.” JUUL Labs, Inc., No. 2020-005JTL at 24-25 n.15.
162

See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Contractarianism in the Business
Associations Classroom, 34 GEO. L. REV. 631 (2000).
163
See generally Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close
Corporations and Agency Costs, 38 STAN. L. REV. 271 (1986); Frank H.
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON.
395 (1983); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control
Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698 (1982); Jensen & Meckling, supra note 107.
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The firm is not simply regarded as a single entity but rather a
nexus of contracts.164 Firms are made of a set of different contracts
between the firm’s various constituencies, such as management and
labor. Additionally, according to the transactional cost theory of the
firm,165 incomplete contracts are the reason for the creation of the firm.
How does this affect our understanding of corporate law? As stated
eloquently by Professor Cox,166 “to nexus-of-contracts adherents,
corporate rules are not mandatory but default rules; the parties are free
to tailor the relationship to their own particular needs.” As such, the
parties are not obligated to follow them, but are free to tailor the
relationship in an agreement as they see fit.
Cox criticized the fact that the Delaware legislature in 2015
amended the Delaware General Corporation Law “to authorize forumselection bylaws.”167 The Delaware legislature acted following a
decision by the Delaware Court of Chancery, Boilermakers Local 154
Retirement Fund v. Chevron Corp (“Boilermakers”).168
In
Boilermakers, the Delaware Court of Chancery upheld a corporate
bylaw provision that was adopted unilaterally by the corporation’s
directors, which designates Delaware as the exclusive forum for certain
types of stockholder litigation. The court found that the forum selection
bylaws were statutorily and contractually valid.169 The end result is that
today directors of a Delaware corporation can adopt such provisions to
prohibit the stockholders from suing them in other states, except for
Delaware.170
164

See Bainbridge, supra note 221. See, e.g., JONATHAN R. MACEY,
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES BROKEN 22 (2008)
(“It has long been recognized . . . that the corporation . . . should be viewed
as a ‘nexus of contracts’ or set of implicit and explicit contracts.”). For an
analysis that separates between the early scholars, see William W. Bratton,
Jr., The “Nexus of Contracts” Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 74
CORNELL L. REV. 407 (1989). See James D. Cox, Corporate Law and the
Limits of Private Ordering, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 257 (2015).
165
See Coase, supra note 49.
166
See Cox, supra note 223.
167
See Cox, supra note 223, at 257 (“In so acting, the legislature gave
managers something they wanted, a way to deal with the scourge of multi-forum
litigation, while pacifying the local bar that feared lucrative shareholder suits
would disappear because of the chilling effect of a loser- pays rule for
shareholder suits.”).

73 A.3d 934, 939–41 (Del. Ch. 2013).
Id.
170
Companies started adopting forum selection bylaws following
remarks by Vice Chancellor J. Travis Laster in the 2010 Revlon case. In re
Revlon, Inc. S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, at 960 (Del. Ch. 2010). See also
Joseph A. Grundfest, The History and Evolution of Intra-Corporate Forum
Selection Clauses: An Empirical Analysis, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 333, 338–39
(2012). In Revlon, Vice Chancellor Laster opined that “if boards of directors
168
169
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It is not a secret that the Delaware courts have a laissez-faire
attitude toward corporate governance contracting.171 Professor Jill
Fisch coined the term “new governance” to illustrate the ways in which
private ordering is used to structure governance rights in organizational
documents.172 There is uncertainty on whether Delaware courts will
uphold waivers of stockholder inspection rights.
Dicta in several cases might suggest that the court may be
willing to uphold such waivers.173 On the other hand, in other cases, the
court did not allow parties to limit stockholder rights. In Kortum v.
Webasto Sunroofs Inc., the court observed that a shareholder’s
agreement does not waive the statutory inspection right and that such a
waiver must be “clearly and affirmatively expressed.”174 In Schoon v.
Troy Corp., the court rejected the argument that the stock purchase
agreement limits, in any way, the information that must be provided
under Section 220.175 As noted, there is uncertainty with regards to this.
The next step in the analysis perhaps, should be, in the event
that the Delaware court decides to enforce the agreement between the
parties. What constitutes consent? Traditional contract theory (and
Coase) relies on bargaining that can then result in the consent to enter
into an agreement. Consent (or the lack of) is linked to another
fundamental theory of private ordering: the hypothesis that the
and stockholders believe that a particular forum would provide an efficient
and value-promoting locus for dispute resolution, then corporations are free
to respond with charter provisions selecting an exclusive forum for intraentity disputes.” See Anne M. Tucker, The Short Road Home to
Delaware: Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund v. Chevron, 7 J. BUS.,
ENTREPRENEURSHIP, & L. 467, 469 (2014).
171
Megan Wischmeier Shaner, Interpreting Organizational
"Contracts" and the Private Ordering of Public Company Governance, 60
WM. & MARY L. REV. 985 (2019).
172
Jill E. Fisch, The New Governance and the Challenge of Litigation
Bylaws, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 1637, 1638-39 (2016).
Shaner, supra note 230. See also D. Gordon Smith et al., Private
Ordering with Shareholder Bylaws, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 125, 127 n.12
(2011).
173
See Fisch, supra note 231.
174
See, e.g., Kortum v. Webasto Sunroofs Inc., 769 A.2d 113, 125 (Del.
Ch. 2000) (observing that the shareholders agreement “does not expressly
provide for a waiver of statutory inspection rights [and] there can be no
waiver of a statutory right unless that waiver is clearly and affirmatively
expressed . . . .”).
175
Schoon v. Troy Corp., 2006 Del. Ch. LEXIS 123, *7 (rejecting
argument that shareholder’s section 220 rights were defined by the stock
purchase agreement).
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resulting contract will account for the terms and these terms are fully
priced into the value of the firm’s securities.
Regardless of whether one agrees with this theory of the firm or
not, the elements of consent and meeting of the minds are necessary for
the contractual paradigm to work.176 With regards to employees, in
several cases, the employees stated that they did not consent to the
contract arrangement and had no knowledge that they are waiving their
stockholder inspection rights. Would that make a difference? The
employees are in a hold up situation.
The problem with employees is very severe, because they
entered into a contract with a company when they are under the
impression that the startup is going to have an exit.177 However, if they
end up working for firms that become unicorns (stay private for long
periods of time) then the employees are in a hold up situation because
they cannot exit easily, have to make an investment decision without
information, and might need to renegotiate the contract with the
company ex-post.
It is clear that the Delaware courts allowed parties to use private
ordering to contract around other types of mandatory laws.178 Recently,
176

See Cox, supra note 223.
See Mark A. Lemley, & Andrew McCreary, Exit Strategy, 101 B.U.
L. REV. 1, 1 (2021) (“The venture capital funding model that dominates the
tech industry is focused on the “exit strategy” — the ways funders and
founders can cash out their investment. While in common lore the exit
strategy is an initial public offering (“IPO”), in practice IPOs are
increasingly rare. Most companies that succeed instead exit the market by
merging with an existing firm.”).
178
In footnote 15 of the JUUL case, the Delaware court cited to the
following cases that recognized the ability to waive not only inspection
rights but even constitutional rights. “See Baio v. Commercial Union Ins.
Co., 410 A.2d 502, 508 (Del. 1979) (“Clearly, our legal system permits one
to waive even a constitutional right . . . and, a fortiori, one may waive a
statutory right.”) (citations omitted); see, e.g., Graham v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 565 A.2d 908, 913 (Del. 1989) (holding that an arbitration
clause in a contract effectuated a valid waiver of the constitutional right to a
jury trial); Manti Hldg., LLC v. Authentix Acq. Co., 2019 WL 3814453, at
*4 (Del. Ch. Aug. 14, 2019) (concluding “that waiver of appraisal rights is
permitted under Delaware law, as long as the relevant contractual provisions
are clear and unambiguous”); Tang Capital P’rs, LP v. Norton, 2012 WL
3072347, at *7 (Del. Ch. July 27, 2012) (holding that the plaintiff
contractually waived its rights to seek a receivership under Section 291 of
the DGCL); Libeau v. Fox, 880 A.2d 1049, 1056 (Del. Ch. 2005) (holding
that the plaintiff waived her right to statutory partition by contract); Red Clay
Educ. Ass’n v. Bd. of Educ. of Red Clay Consol. Sch. Dist., 1992 WL 14965,
at *6 (Del. Ch. Jan. 16, 1992) (holding that a provision in a collective
bargaining agreement constituted an effective waiver of negotiation right
177
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in Manti Holdings LLC v. Authentix Acquisition Co., private equity and
venture capital investors won the case when the Delaware Supreme
Court confirmed the enforceability of appraisal waivers by private
contract. Manti, however, should be distinguished from cases like
Domo or JUUL because of the negotiation power of the parties
involved. In Manti, the stockholders that agreed to the waiver were
sophisticated, informed, and represented by counsel. They
presumabely had some bargaining power, unlike company employees
who are not sophisticated, informed, and represented by counsel when
they enter into stock option agreements.179
What about Section 220? If the court feels that there is a vague
legal standard here, perhaps it is waiting for the Delaware legislature to
change the law so that parties can account ex ante to this complexity?
As we know, creating bright-line rules is very important for lowering
costs and having certainty for all the parties involved. This issue needs
to be resolved sooner than later.
Delaware courts may endorse this should they hear an appeal
from Juul v. Grove. Moreover, this issue can also be litigated in other
states, outside of Delaware, due to concern by plaintiff bar that
Delaware courts will side with management. In JUUL, for example, the
suit was brought a suit in California, invoking California’s Section
1601.180 Until now, it was my understanding that in a case like this, a
California court is entitled to apply California law, because the plaintiff
is a California resident, and is seeking to inspect the books and records
of a Delaware corporation that is doing business as a foreign
corporation in California.
Building on Stephen Bainbridge’s work, and use his textbook
to teach my students Business Associations. Bainbridge postulates that
under unfair labor practices statute). The Kortum decision, cited above, held
that a bilateral agreement had not waived statutory inspection rights where
the waiver was not “clearly and affirmatively” expressed. See Kortum, 769
A.2d at 125; accord Schoon v. Troy Corp., 2006 WL 1851481, at *2 (Del.
Ch. June 27, 2006). Perhaps even a clear and express waiver would be
contrary to public policy under Penn- Beaver and its progeny, but the
standard set forth in Kortum, at minimum, implies that a stockholders’
agreement could waive statutory inspection rights if the waiver was
sufficiently clear.” JUUL Labs, Inc., No. 2020-005-JTL at 24-25 n.15.
Upshots of Del. Holding on Appraisal Rights Waivers in M&A,
https://www.troutman.com/insights/upshots-of-del-holding-on-appraisalrights-waivers-in-manda.html
180
California adopted section 1601 inspection of books and records
from the MBCA.
179

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4037705

53
he “long understood (and taught) that shareholder inspection rights are
a rare exception to the internal affairs doctrine.”181 To my surprise, the
Delaware court in JUUL held that under United States Supreme Court
and Delaware Supreme Court precedent, stockholder inspection rights
are a matter of internal affairs. Is it?
Delaware law is my bible, however, the following is a short
explanation of this analysis, and more importantly the ramifications for
future corporate practice and litigation.
E.

Internal Affairs

Every state in the U.S. has its own unique set of state corporate
laws. These provide a standard set of rules for investors, shareholders,
managers, creditors, directors and other stakeholders. These
differences are possible thanks to a choice of law rule called the
“internal affairs doctrine.”
Under the internal affairs doctrine, the laws that govern the
corporation and any future disputes between the parties arising from
the internal affairs of the corporation, are determined by the state of
incorporation. That is why the state of incorporation governs the
disputes between parties, even when the firm is predominantly doing
business in other state and is located outside the state of incorporation.
In the JUUL case, a claim was brought in California to inspect
the books. JUUL is a foreign corporation that is doing business within
the borders of California. It is a corporation outside of California, in
Delaware. At issue is which state law governs? California or Delaware?
This is a conflicts of law question. It involves the rights of a shareholder
of a Delaware corporation, which is headquartered in California and
doing substantial business in California. It poses special problems
because this issue which can be determined differently depending on
181

Stephen Bainbridge, Are Shareholder Inspection Rights Subject to
the Internal Affairs Doctrine?, PROFESSORBAINDRIDGE.COM BLOG (Oct. 5,
2020),
https://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2020/1
0/are-shareholder-inspection-rights-subject-to-the-internal-affairsdoctrine.html. Building on Bainbridge’s work, I also teach the case Crane
Co. v. Anaconda Co., 346 N.E.2d 507 (N.Y. 1976), in which the court
applied New York law to determine whether a shareholder (that was
incorporated in Illinois) was eligible to examine the stockholder list of a
company incorporated in Montana. (Access to stockholder lists, in fact, is a
well-established exception to the internal affairs doctrine as a matter of both
corporate law and conflicts of law.)
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the state in question. It should be noted that these types of cases can
and probably will continue to come up in this context, as is illustrated
by the empirical investigation below.
The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws,182 provides that
states can exercise authority to require disclosure. However, this is an
evolving and intriguing area of the law, which has been and still is
evolving rapidly. As noted by Francis Pillegi, Section 220 is not for the
faint-hearted. It is well established that a foreign corporation authorized
to do business in a state is going to be subject to that domestic state’s
statutory provisions. Unless the language in the domestic state’s statute
has some sort of limitations, such as explicit language that it only
applies to domestic corporations. Most states respect requests for
access to corporate books and records.183
The JUUL case raises constitutional questions, and inquiries
about the concept of the corporation and limits of state power.184 State
sovereignty suggests that the state can exercise its power and authority
within its borders (jurisdiction).185 Each state has powers to subject
182

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF

CONFLICT

OF

LAWS § 304, cmt. d

(1971).
183

In JUUL, in footnote 7, the court states that there is a substantial
volume of authority that posits that the internal affairs doctrine should not
limit the ability of a non-chartering jurisdiction to grant rights to inspect the
books and records of a foreign corporation. The court cited the following
sources: “See, e.g., 36 Am. Jur. 2d Foreign Corporations § 58, Westlaw
(database updated Aug. 2020). id. § 377; Deborah A. DeMott, Shareholder
Derivative Actions: Law and Practice § 2:13(1) (2019–20) (collecting
“inspection cases” involving the “application of forum-state law” to a
foreign corporation); K. M. Potraker, Annotation, Stockholder’s Right to
Inspect Books and Records of Foreign Corporation, 19 A.L.R.3d 869 (1968)
(collecting cases); see also Elvin R. Latty, Pseudo-Foreign Corporations,
65 Yale L.J. 137, 138–39 (1955) (“Legislation relating to corporations not
infrequently contains protective provisions that the parties to be protected
cannot ‘waive’ by contract in drafting the charter.)”. JUUL Labs, Inc. v.
Grove, No. 2020-005-JTL, at 12-13 n.7 (Del. Ch. Aug. 13, 2020).
184
The internal affairs doctrine rises to the level of a constitutional
doctrine. See Can California Require Delaware Corporations to Comply
with California's New Board of Director Gender Diversity Mandate? No,
PROFESSOR
BAINBRIDGE.COM
(Sept.
1,
2018),
https://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2018/09/ca
n-california-require-delaware-corporations-to-comply-with-californiasnew-board-of-director-gender.html; And Stephen Bainbridge, Contributor,
California Corporate-Board Quota Law Unlikely to Survive a
Constitutional Challenge , WASH. LEGAL FOUND. (Oct. 2, 2018),
https://www.wlf.org/2018/10/02/wlf-legal-pulse/california-corporateboard-quota-law-unlikely-to-survive-a-constitutional-challenge/.
185
According to the JUUL court, “That concept of the corporation (and
of state-chartered entities more generally) can have implications for the valid
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persons, including domestic and foreign corporations, and goods to the
process of its courts based on its adjudicative jurisdiction.186 The
crucial question that arises from the JUUL case is whether Delaware’s
jurisdiction extends outside its borders? Is a California court going to
say to the parties – you need to take this lawsuit to Delaware? or will
apply Delaware law?
The important take away from the JUUL case is that Delaware
law applies for inspection cases, regardless of where a company’s
principal place of business is located.187 It is not surprising, therefore,
that the Delaware court in JUUL declared that the employee’s rights as
a stockholder are governed by Delaware law, and that he thus could not
seek an inspection under California’s Section 1601.188

exercise of one state’s power in relation to other states.” JUUL Labs, Inc.,
No. 2020-005-JTL at 14 n.7.
186
According to the JUUL court, “the DGCL rests on a concept of the
corporation that is grounded in a sovereign exercise of state authority: the
chartering of a “body corporate” that comes into existence on the date on
which a certificate of incorporation becomes effective.” Id. at 14 n.7. See 8
DEL. C. § 106. Id.
187
“Under principles articulated by the Supreme Court of the United
States and applied by the Delaware Supreme Court, Delaware law governs
its internal affairs. The scope of Grove’s inspection rights is a matter of
internal affairs, so Delaware law applies.” JUUL Labs, Inc., No. 2020-005JTL at 2.
188
“Because Grove’s inspection rights implicate the Company’s
internal affairs, Grove must pursue any remedy in this court under the
exclusive forum-selection provision in the Company’s certificate of
incorporation.” Id. at 2. The court is citing the following sources: “George
S. Geis, Information Litigation in Corporate Law, 71 Ala. L. Rev. 407, 448
(2019) (“Inspection rights clearly relate to the internal affairs of the
corporation . . . .”); P. John Kozyris, Corporate Wars and Choice of Law,
1985 Duke L.J. 1, 63 (stating that “[c]ertain internal affairs matters are even
less amenable to differential treatment than others” and that “[t]he hard core
areas where ‘indivisible unity’ is paramount should include first and
foremost the rights that attach to corporate shares” like “obtaining
information” and “inspecting corporate records”); Deborah A. DeMott,
Perspectives on Choice of Law for Corporate Internal Affairs, 48 L. &
Contemp. Probs. 161, 168 (1985) [hereinafter DeMott, Perspectives on
Choice of Law] (describing “shareholders’ inspection rights” as one of the
“quintessentially internal matters”); see Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws § 304 (concluding that the law of the state of incorporation generally
should “determine the right of a shareholder to participate in the
administration of the affairs of the corporation”); 17 William Meade
Fletcher et al., Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations §
8434 (Sept. 2019 update) (“It has been held that shareholder meetings and
maintenance of books and records were ‘internal affairs’ of the corporation
not subject to regulation in another state.”).” Id. at 16 n.8.
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But the question remains - what about the other states? are they
going to follow Delaware or resist? Delaware is the state of choice for
incorporation for many firms in the U.S. and around the world. What
about unicorns? In a separate study, relying on hand collected data
consisting of various filings, I find that 89% of the unicorn firms in the
United States choose to incorporate in Delaware.189 Thus, any
Delaware court decision on this issue will determine the rights of
hundreds of thousands of unicorn employees across the U.S.
There is still uncertainty with regards to choice of law clauses
because the question of whether forum selection clauses, for example,
are even enforceable is usually highly contested in the U.S.. Can
contracting parties exercise their autonomy and select via contract
the forum in which these types of books and records disputes will be
resolved? The answer to this question requires further research on
constitutional law and is therefore outside the scope of this Article.
One thing is clear, other states can and in practice do define the
terms by which stockholders of a foreign corporation can inspect books
and records in their jurisdiction. Unfortunately for practitioners, this
means uncertainty. A Delaware corporation is going to be subjected to
different legal and policy standards, depending on the specific
jurisdiction and the ways in which that jurisdiction follows Delaware
law.
Perhaps, parties can state as clearly as possible that they want
their clause to (a) be exclusive or non-exclusive, (b) apply or not apply
to this specific type of claim – inspection of books and records, (c)
apply or not apply to non-signatories, or (d) select specific state courts
that have authority to adjudicate these matters.
Figure 1: This figure breaks down the percentages of each corporation
that has adopted a waiver by examining the state in which their
headquarters is located

189
See Anat Alon-Beck, Where do Unicorns Incorporate? (work in
progress).
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Headquarters of Corporations with Waivers
of Statutory Information Rights
California
Connecticut
Maryland
Massachusetts

56.45%

New
Hampshire
New York
North Carolina
Outside of US

F.
NVCA Moves to Standardize Statutory Stockholder
Inspection Waivers
Another very important development in this field is an effort by
interest groups that represent tech firms to standardize statutory
stockholder inspection waivers. Recently, between July 28, 2020 and
September 1, 2020, the National Venture Capital Association (the
“NVCA”) released updates to its model legal documents for use in
venture capital financing transactions that incorporated the waiver
language in the Investors’ Right Agreement (“IRA”).190
The purpose of this change is to reduce the potential claims
from shareholders involving demands for access to books and records
under Section 220 of the DGCL. Some law firms even advise their
clients that a Delaware court may hold the waiver provision
enforceable, given the trend to enforce private agreements between
sophisticated investors.191 Do they consider the fact that employees are
190

Venture Capital Investing: New NVCA Models, and New Challenges
for Foreign Investors in Early-Stage U.S. Companies, CLEARY GOTLLIEB
(Oct. 7, 2020), https://www.clearygottlieb.com/-/media/files/alert-memos2020/20201007-venture-capital-investing-new-nvca-models-andchallenges-for--pdf.pdf.
191
Cameron R. Kates, James B. Jumper, Daniel R. Sieck & Geoffrey S.
Garrett, Modeling the Market: The National Venture Capital Association
Revises its Model Documents, TROUTMAN PEPPER (Sept. 16, 2020),
https://www.troutman.com/insights/modeling-the-market-the-nationalventure-capital-association-revises-its-model-documents.html.
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not represented and not accredited to be sophisticated? Perhaps,
however, I strongly disagree with this view.
V.

SUGGESTIONS

Delaware courts need to provide more clarity in this area of the
law where choice of law issues is relatively likely to come up on a
regular basis in the future — stockholder inspection rights.
Specifically, with regards to unicorn firms, since 89% of them are
incorporated in Delaware.
A.

Delaware Courts

Delaware courts should not depart from the established
common law tradition that enforces mandatory immutable inspection
rights. Delaware courts should make it clear that it is not permittable to
contract out of mandatory stockholder inspection rights. More
importantly, Delaware courts should declare that they will continue to
allow minority employee stockholders to access the books and records
of their companies under Section 220 in order to evaluate their stake in
the company.
This does not represent a radical shift in the law but rather a
restoration of the understanding of it that existed long before Domo or
JUUL were litigated. Delaware courts have consistently taken steps to
protect minority shareholders. Despite attempts under federal law to
strip away employees’ status as shareholders, Delaware should step up
and consider the broader role these shareholders play in governance
and corporate purpose.
B.

Delaware Legislature

The Delaware legislature should not amend its statutes to enable
corporations to waive the important stockholder inspection right via
private ordering. Section 220 affords protection to minority
stockholders from the oppressive behavior of the majority by allowing
minority stockholders to gain access to their company’s books and
records.
Unfortunately, DGCL Section 220 does not offer such
protections to stock-option-holders. Therefore, this Article further calls
on legislature to amend its statutes in order to enable stock-option-
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holders, in limited situations, to access their companies’ books and
records under DGCL Section 220. Such stock-option-holders
inspection right can be drafted to clearly state that they only include
certain categories, such as employees, and further limit it to information
would only be provided at a reasonable time, in connection with a
proper purpose and limit the type of information provided to value the
equity.

C.

Practitioners Everywhere

Practitioners, who are advising tech companies should innovate
by helping their clients to find ways to provide information to their
employees while protecting the firm’s intellectual property. A
departure from the traditional stock option model will not benefit the
firm.
Practitioners are innovating because they want to protect the
firm from a rise in potential lawsuits from employees, which is
understandable. But they need to fix the problem, not cerate a bigger
one. This waiver does not solve the problem but makes it worse. When
employees complain about their company in public (on online
platforms) and initiate lawsuits against the company, it raises costs. The
firm has to monitor, retain and engage labor, especially when there is a
short supply and fierce competition in technology markets.
The problem is about asymmetry of information. To mitigate it,
attorneys can require that the firm disclose the following information
to employees. First, in addition to the Stock Option Purchase
Agreement and the Plan, the attorney can produce a schedule with the
amount of capital that was raised by the company until that point. The
schedule would include a list of investors that received liquidation
preferences and founders who were granted super voting common
stock.
Second, disclose how much debt has accumulated (including
debt evidenced by convertible or SAFE notes). Third, if the firm allows
employees to trade on secondary platforms, it will also provide
appropriate disclosure, including any restrictions on resale, to make
sure that employees understand and comply with the applicable
securities regulations. If firm does not allow employees to trade on
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secondary platforms, then it can facilitate private secondary market
sales, or stock buybacks.192
Fourth, disclosure would include information on the
compensation of the management team, information concerning
current and future stock and debt issuances, a list of investors holding
more than a specified percentage (perhaps 15%) of the outstanding
stock (including their liquidation preferences and conversion rights),
and a quarterly estimated fair market value of the stock. Finally, a
request that unicorns be audited by an independent auditing firm. The
employees should have access to and be entitled to rely on these
reports.193
Employers may not have much choice going forward.
According to Barzuza, Curtis, and Webber, Millennial employees,
consumers, and investors are more willing to demand what they call
“radical transparency.”194 This calls for information far exceeding the
minimum requirements of securities laws and public companies are
responding rapidly in an attempt to build loyalty amongst this
generation and Gen Z, their younger counterparts.195 Over the next two
decades, these two generations will represent the majority of
employees, investors, and voters.196 It is essential for unicorns to adapt
as well to avoid the potential backlash and to create the loyalty they
will need to maintain their human capital pool.197
These disclosures can produce increasingly equitable and
sustainable employee participation in unicorn companies. Although
these disclosures are equitable for employees—and can show that
investing in the company is sustainable—disclosures are a nightmare
for unicorn management teams. There is a need for innovation with
192

See Ric Marshall et al., Taking Stock: Share Buybacks and
Shareholder Value, Harv. Law School F. Corp. Governance & Fin. Reg.
(Aug. 19, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/08/19/taking-stockshare-buybacks-and-shareholder-value/
[https://perma.cc/SL43-FMXR]
(finding no compelling evidence of a negative impact from share buybacks
on long-term value creation for investors overall).
193
For alternative suggestions on disclosure, see Aran, supra note 55,
Making Disclosure Work for Start-Up Employees.
194
See Michael Barzuza, Quinn Curtis & David H. Webber, The Millennial
Corporation
(Dec.
14,
2021),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3918443.
195
Id.
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Id.
197
See Alon-Beck, supra note 50; see Anat Alon-Beck, Michal AgmonGonnen & Darren Rosenblum, No More Old Boys’ Club: Institutional Investors’
Fiduciary Duty to Advance Board Gender Diversity, 55 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 102
(2021).
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regards to disclosure practices. Time will tell whether Section 220 will
alleviate the problem of golden handcuffs and the ensuing constraint
on employee mobility.198
VI.

CONCLUSION

Unicorns stay private longer for various reasons, but in large
part, to avoid public disclosures that could reveal their true financial
conditions and fair market value, including to their own employees.
Unicorns are notorious for their exaggerated valuations. Employees are
not privy to confidential information, including financial statements,
shareholder lists, and other material non-public documents. Unicorns
are likely to refuse access to employees seeking such information.
Unicorn firms’ founders, investors, and their lawyers have
systematically abused equity award information asymmetry to their
personal benefit. They use ex ante waivers of inspection rights or ex
post nondislosure agreements in an effort to limit some shareholder
inspection rights via private ordering. Unicorn firms do not provide
their minority common stockholders and stock option holders—
specifically, their employees—with information on their stake in the
company, which could improve efficiency and reduce information
asymmetries. Unicorn employees do not have access to financial
reports and, in many cases, are denied access to such reports.
This Article demonstrates that following a recent Delaware
case, Biederman vs. Domo, unicorns adopted a new, pervasive practice
that compels their employees to waive inspection. Relying on a handcollected data set consisting of the SEC’s public filings, I found that
unicorn firms require their employees to waive their inspection rights
under DGCL Section 220 as a condition to receiving stock options from
the company. Employees sign a waiver clause titled “Waiver of
Statutory Information Rights,” in which they waive their inspection
rights of the following materials: company stock ledger, a list of its
stockholders, other books and records, and the books and records of
subsidiaries of the company. The waiver remains in effect until the first
sale of the company’s common stock to the public occurs.
Unicorn employees are turning to the courts to compel their
companies to open up their books and records and to disclose financial
information. Employees who are stock option holders, but not
stockholders yet, do not have a right to access such information under
Delaware law. To have standing in court, the employee must first
198

See supra Section IV.
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exercise her options and become a stockholder of record. This Article
advocates for reform. Both minority stockholders and stock option
holders should be entitled to information so they can make informed
investment decisions, such as deciding whether to exercise their
options or to let them expire overnight.
The Article also presents evidence that U.S. unicorn firms
prefer to incorporate in Delaware. Relying on hand-collected data, I
found that 89% of the unicorns in the United States are incorporated in
Delaware. Therefore, the Article calls on the Delaware courts and
legislature not to allow unicorns to modify or eliminate the mandatory
inspection rights expressly set forth in the DGCL. Delaware law is and
should continue to serve as a valuable tool for minority stockholders
and stock option holders (employees) who are questioning the value of
their shares. Delaware courts and legislators’ actions on and resolution
of this important issue will have tremendous influence on corporate
law, litigation, and practice.
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VII.

APPENDIX

Table 1: Unicorn Firms Incorporated in Delaware with Public Record of Statutory Waiver of Information
Date of
Valuation of
Incorporation
Date of Waiver
Firm (Billions)
Corporation
JUUL Labs
3/12/2007
$50.0
DoorDash

5/21/2013

SoFi

4/26/2011

4.5

OpenDoor Labs

12/30/2013

3.8

GoodRx

9/12/2011

Pax Labs

4/21/2017

Asana, Inc.

12/16/2008

11/13/2020

8/28/2020

12.6

2.8
1.7

8/24/2020

1.5

Segment

5/2/2011

One Medical Group

7/5/2002

1/3/2020

1

Casper

10/24/2013

1/10/2020

1.1

Hims

12/30/2013

1/26/2021

1.1

Sumo Logic

3/29/2010

8/24/2020

1

1.5
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